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Introduction 
The interest in problems of general choice theory can be explained by the fact that many 
problems of applied mathematics and control theory boil down to choosing the «best» 
alternatives, in some sense, from a given set.  
The choice problem can be formally defined as follows [1]. Let A be a finite set of 
alternatives, |A|>2. Any subset Xϵ2A may be presented for choice; it is called a presentation. 
Denote by С(∙) a choice function that performs the mapping 2A→2A with the restriction      
  for any Xϵ2A. A choice consists in the selection according to some rule from some presentation 
X of the non-empty subset of alternatives     (non-empty subset of «best» alternatives). 
The simplest example of the choice problem is the choice on one criterion. In that case, 
some constraints are set and the choice consists in minimization or maximization of a given 
criterion under these constraints. Thus, the choice of alternatives is accomplished on pre-defined 
optimality criterion with the use of some extremization procedure. 
However, most real-life choice problems usually deal with multiple criteria. Currently, 
there are many methods of transforming multi-criteria optimization problem into a single 
criterion optimization problem but, unfortunately, these methods cannot always be applied. For 
instance, some criteria may conflict with others, and in that case, the choice problem lies in 
providing a compromise set of alternatives, so the end-user can choose the most appropriate of 
them. 
There are a lot of different multi-criteria choice procedures that allow to choose and rank 
alternatives from the initial set. All these choice procedures can be divided into 5 following 
groups [1-9]: 
1. Scoring rules; 
2. Rules, using majority relation; 
3. Rules, using value function; 
4. Rules, using tournament matrix; 
5. q-Paretian rules,  
from which we consider only first 4 groups. 
The change of presentation, a set of criteria or criterial values of some alternatives can 
affect the final choice. Consequently, there is a need for more detailed study of existing choice 
procedures and for understanding which of them can be used in a particular case. 
In this paper we consider the situation when criterial estimates of alternatives are 
presented in the form of rankings. We focus on the study of the properties of different multi-
criteria choice procedures in order to define which normative conditions are satisfied for the 
given choice procedures. The paper is divided into several sections. First, the description of 
different choice procedures is given. Second, normative conditions are presented. Finally, we 
study the properties of choice procedures and give a theorem that shows how stable and sensible 
is a set of alternatives obtained after applying some choice procedure. 
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A description of choice procedures 
In Table 1 we provide a list of multi-criteria choice procedures which are studied in this 
work. 
Table 1. A list of studied choice procedures 
№ Choice procedure Type of choice procedure 
1 The simple majority rule 
Scoring rules 
2 The plurality rule 
3 The inverse plurality rule 
4 The q-Approval rule 
5 The run-off procedure 
6 The Hare rule (the Ware procedure) 
7 The Borda rule 
8 The Black procedure 
9 The inverse Borda rule 
10 The Nanson rule 
11 The Coombs procedure 
12 Minimal dominant set 
Rules, using majority 
relation 
13 Minimal undominated set 
14 Minimal weakly stable set 
15 The Fishburn rule 
16 Uncovered set I 
17 Uncovered set II 
18 The Richelson rule 
19 The Condorcet winner 
20 The core 
21 k-stable set 
22 The threshold rule 
Rules, using value function 
23 The Copeland rule 1 
24 The Copeland rule 2 
25 The Copeland rule 3 
26 The super-threshold rule 
27 The minimax procedure Rules, using tournament 
matrix 28 The Simpson procedure 
Let us give a definition of the rules provided in Table 1.  
Definition 1 [10]. The relation P is called 
 the partial order if P is irreflexive (            ) and transitive (          
    and        ); 
 the weak order if P is a partial order satisfying the condition for negative transitivity 
(                 and                ); and 
 the linear order if P is a connected (               or    ) weak order. 
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Definition 2 [11]. A set of binary relations (       ) is called a preference profile and is 
denoted as  ⃗  or     
 .  
Let us denote a set of profiles consisting of linear orders as  . Obviously, if the number 
of alternatives of the set A is equal to m, i.e., | |   , then | |       . We also introduce the 
notion of the contraction of the profile  ⃗  onto a set    . 
Definition 3 [10]. A contraction of the profile  ⃗  onto a set    ,    , is a profile 
 ⃗                , where              .  
Denote by  ( ⃗    ) a choice function which is a mapping of preference profile  ⃗   on the 
set of alternatives, i.e.,          , that satisfies the condition    ⃗        for any Xϵ2
A
. 
The q-Approval rule and the k-stable set which are described below also depend on parameters q 
and k. We denote these choice procedures by  ( ⃗      ) and  ( ⃗      ), respectively. 
Definition 4 [1].  
a) Majority relation is a binary relation   which is constructed as 
             |              |     . 
b) A directed graph of majority relation µ is called a majority graph. 
Definition 5 [10].  
a) Upper contour set of an alternative x for a given profile  ⃗  is the set      ⃗   such that 
     ⃗       |     . 
b) Lower contour set of x for a given profile  ⃗  is the set      ⃗   such that 
     ⃗       |     . 
In this paper we consider criterial scales of a special type according to which all 
alternatives are arranged in n linear orders   . Let us now describe different multi-criteria choice 
procedures which are used in this case [1-9]. 
1. The simple majority rule 
Choose alternatives that have been admitted to be the best by 50% + 1 criteria, i.e., 
   ( ⃗    )  [  
 (   ⃗  )  
 
 
 ∑   (   ⃗  )    
 
 
 | ⃗  |], 
where   (   ⃗  )           |                . 
Example. Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
a a a b b d d d 
b b c c c c b b 
c c d a a b c c 
d d b d d a a a 
In this example   (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   , and 
| ⃗  |  ∑  
 (   ⃗  )     . Since      
 (   ⃗  )   , the choice is empty, i.e., ( ⃗    )   . 
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2. The plurality rule 
Choose alternatives that have been admitted to be the best by the maximum number of 
criteria, i.e., 
   ( ⃗    )  [       
 (   ⃗  )   
 (   ⃗  )], 
where   (   ⃗  )           |                . 
Consider the previous example.   (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   , 
  (   ⃗  )   . According to the plurality rule the alternatives a and d will be chosen, i.e., 
 ( ⃗    )       . 
 
3. The inverse plurality rule 
The alternative, which is regarded as the worst by the minimum number of criteria, is 
chosen, i.e., 
   ( ⃗    )  [       
 (   ⃗  )   
 (   ⃗  )], 
where   (   ⃗  )           |                . 
Consider the previous example.   (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   , 
  (   ⃗  )   . According to the inverse plurality rule the alternative c will be chosen, i.e., 
 ( ⃗    )     . 
 
4. The q-Approval Rule 
Let us define 
  (   ⃗    )           |         |          , 
where   (   ⃗    ) is the number of criteria for which the alternative a is placed on one of q first 
places in the ordering of alternatives. Thus, if , then  is the first best alternative for 
criterion i; if , then  is either first best or second best alternative, etc. The integer q can be 
called as the degree of the choice procedure. 
Now we can define the q-Approval rule: 
   ( ⃗      )  [       
 (   ⃗    )   
 (   ⃗    )], 
i.e., the alternatives are chosen that have been admitted to be among q best alternatives by the 
maximum number of criteria. 
It can be easily seen that the q-Approval rule is a direct generalization of the plurality 
rule; for the latter . 
Consider the previous example. Let us calculate the value   (   ⃗    ) for each     
depending on parameter value q. 
q   (   ⃗    )  
 (   ⃗    )  
 (   ⃗    )  
 (   ⃗    )  ( ⃗      ) 
q=1 3 2 0 3 {a,d} 
q=2 3 6 4 3 {b} 
q=3 5 7 8 4 {c} 
q=4 8 8 8 8 {a,b,c,d} 
 
1=q a
2=q a
1=q
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5. The run-off procedure 
First, the simple majority rule is used. If a winner exists, the  procedure stops. Otherwise, 
two alternatives that have been admitted to be the best by the maximum number of criteria are 
taken. Assuming that preferences about these two alternatives do not change, again the simple 
majority rule is applied. Since alternatives are arranged in n linear orders, single winner (if n is 
odd) always exists. 
Consider the previous example. First, the simple majority rule is used. As it was mentioned 
before, according to the simple majority rule the choice is empty. In that case the alternatives a 
and d are taken for the next stage of the procedure. Consider now the set          and the 
profile  ⃗    that looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
a a a a a d d d 
d d d d d a a a 
According to the simple majority rule   (   ⃗   )   ,  
 (   ⃗   )   , | ⃗   |   . 
Consequently, the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )   ( ⃗     
 )     . 
 
6. The Hare procedure (the Ware procedure) 
The Hare procedure (also known as the Ware procedure [4]) is a modification of a single 
transferable vote system for the case when there is a need to choose a single alternative that have 
been admitted to be the best by 50% + 1 criteria. 
First, the simple majority rule is used. If a winner exists, the  procedure stops. Otherwise, 
the alternative x that have been admitted to be the best by the minimum number of criteria is 
omitted. Then the procedure again applied to the narrowed set          and the profile  ⃗   . 
The procedure stops when an alternative that has been admitted to be the best by 50% + 1 criteria 
is found. 
Consider the previous example. First, the simple majority rule is used. According to it the 
choice is empty. In that case, the alternatives b and c are omitted for the next stage of the 
procedure, as they are admitted to be the best by the minimum number of criteria. Consider now 
the set          and the profile  ⃗    that looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
a a a a a d d d 
d d d d d a a a 
For this case   (   ⃗   )   ,  
 (   ⃗   )    and | ⃗   |   . According to the simple 
majority rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )     . 
 
7. The Borda rule 
Put to each     into correspondence a number   (   ⃗  ) which is equal to the 
cardinality of the lower contour set of   in     ⃗  , i.e.,   (   ⃗  )  |          |. The sum of 
that numbers over all  is called the Borda count for the alternative  
 (   ⃗  )  ∑   (   ⃗  )
 
   . 
  
Ni ,x
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An alternative with the maximum Borda count is chosen, i.e., 
     ⃗      [       (   ⃗  )       ⃗   ]. 
Consider the previous example.  (   ⃗  )    ,  (   ⃗  )    ,  (   ⃗  )    ,  (   ⃗  )  
  . Thus,  ( ⃗    )     . 
 
8. The Condorcet winner 
The Condorcet winner C( ⃗    ) in the profile  ⃗   is an alternative that dominates all other 
alternatives via majority relation µ (constructed according to the profile), i.e., 
 ( ⃗    )      |             . 
Consider the previous example. Since                    , i.e., there is no alternative 
that dominates all other alternatives via majority relation µ, the Condorcet winner does not exist. 
Thus,  ( ⃗    )   . 
 
9. The Black procedure 
If the Condorcet winner exists, it is to be chosen. Otherwise, the Borda rule is applied. 
Consider the previous example. Since there is no Condorcet winner, the Borda rule is 
applied. As it was shown before, the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )     . 
 
10. The inverse Borda procedure 
The inverse Borda procedure was proposed by J.M. Baldwin [4], so it is also known as 
the Baldwin procedure. 
For each alternative the Borda count is calculated and the alternative with the minimum 
Borda count is omitted. Then Borda counts are re-calculated for the profile  ⃗   ,  
       , and 
the procedure is repeated until the choice is found. 
Consider the previous example.  (   ⃗  )    ,  (   ⃗  )    ,  (   ⃗  )    ,  (   ⃗  )  
  . According to the inverse Borda procedure the alternative d is omitted on the first stage. 
Consider now the set            and the profile  ⃗    that looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
a a a b b c b b 
b b c c c b c c 
c c b a a a a a 
Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative     :  (   ⃗   )   ,  (   ⃗   )  
  ,  (   ⃗   )   . According to the inverse Borda procedure the alternative a is omitted on the 
second stage. Consider now the set           and the profile  ⃗     that looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
b b c b b c b b 
c c b c c b c c 
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The Borda count for each alternative       is the following:  (   ⃗    )   ,  (   ⃗    )   . 
According to the inverse Borda procedure the alternative c is omitted and the alternative b will be 
chosen. Thus,  ( ⃗    )     . 
 
11. The Nanson procedure 
For each alternative the Borda count is calculated. Then the average Borda count is 
calculated, 
 ̅( ⃗    )  
∑  (   ⃗  )   
| |
  
and alternatives are omitted for which the Borda count is less or equal than the mean value. Then 
the set          is considered, where     is a set of alternatives with the Borda count that 
is less or equal than the average value, and the procedure is applied to the profile  ⃗   . Such 
procedure is repeated until all remaining alternatives will have the same Borda count. 
Consider the previous example.  (   ⃗  )    ,  (   ⃗  )       (   ⃗  )    ,  (   ⃗  )  
  ,  ̅( ⃗    )    . According to the Nanson procedure the alternatives a and d are omitted. 
Consider now the set          and the profile  ⃗    that looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
b b c b b c b b 
c c b c c b c c 
Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative     :  (   ⃗   )   ,  (   ⃗   )   , 
 ̅( ⃗     
 )   . According to the Nanson procedure the alternative c is omitted and, consequently, 
the alternative b will be chosen. Thus,  ( ⃗    )     . 
 
12. The Coombs procedure 
First, the simple majority rule is used. If a winner exists, the  procedure stops. Otherwise, 
the alternative x that have been admitted to be the worst by the maximum number of criteria is 
omitted. Then the procedure again applied to the narrowed set          and the profile  ⃗   . 
The procedure stops when an alternative that have been admitted to be the best by 50% + 1 
criteria is found. 
It is necessary to note the difference between the Coombs procedure and the Hare 
procedure. In the Coombs procedure we eliminate alternatives that have been admitted to be the 
worst by the maximum number of criteria while in the Hare procedure we eliminate alternatives 
that have been admitted to be the best by the minimum number of criteria. 
Consider the previous example. As it was mentioned before, according to the simple 
majority rule the choice is empty. In that case, we eliminate alternatives that have been admitted 
to be the worst by the maximum number of criteria. Since   (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   , 
  (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   , the alternative d is omitted on the first stage of the rule. Consider 
now the set            and the profile  ⃗    that looks as 
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P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
a a a b b c b b 
b b c c c b c c 
c c b a a a a a 
According to the simple majority rule the choice is empty. Since   (   ⃗   )   , 
  (   ⃗   )   ,  
 (   ⃗   )   , the alternative a is omitted on the second stage of the rule. 
Finally, let us consider the set           and the profile  ⃗     that looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
b b c b b c b b 
c c b c c b c c 
The simple majority rule is applied for this case. Since   (   ⃗    )   ,  
 (   ⃗    )   , 
| ⃗    |   , the alternative b will be chosen ( 
 (   ⃗    )  
 
 
 | ⃗    |). Thus,  ( ⃗    )     . 
 
13. Minimal dominant set 
A set Q is called dominant one if each alternative in Q dominates each alternative outside 
Q via majority relation µ. Otherwise speaking,      
                 . 
Then a dominant set Q is called the minimal one if none of its proper subsets is a 
dominant set. The choice is defined as  ( ⃗    )   . If such set is not unique, then the social 
choice is defined as the union of these sets. 
Consider the previous example. A majority graph for the profile  ⃗   is the following 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The alternatives a,b,c,d make the minimal dominant set. Thus,  ( ⃗    )      
         . 
 
14. Minimal undominated set 
A set Q is called undominated one if no alternative outside Q dominates some alternative 
in Q via majority relation µ, i.e., 
                 . 
Undominated set Q is called the minimal one if none of its proper subsets is undominated 
set. The choice is defined as  ( ⃗    )   . If such set is not unique, then the choice is defined 
as the union of these sets. 
For the previous example the alternative b makes the minimal undominated set. Thus, 
 ( ⃗    )       . 
 
d 
c 
a 
b 
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15. Minimal weakly stable set 
A set     is called weakly stable if it has the following property:      
                           , 
i.e., x belongs to Q if there exists an alternative       which dominates x via majority relation 
µ, then there exists an alternative    , which dominates  , i.e.,    . A set     is called the 
minimal weakly stable one if none of its proper subsets is a weakly stable set. The choice is 
defined as  ( ⃗    )   . If such set is not unique, then the choice is defined as the union of 
these sets. 
For the previous example the alternative b makes the minimal weakly stable set. Thus, 
 ( ⃗    )       . 
 
16. The Fishburn rule 
Construct the upper contour set      ⃗    of   in the relation µ, and the binary relation   
as follows 
         ⃗         ⃗   . 
Note that the binary relation γ is a partial order. 
Then undominated alternatives on   are chosen, i.e., 
   ( ⃗    )            . 
For the previous example the upper contour sets for each alternative are  (   ⃗  )  
       (   ⃗  )   ,  (   ⃗  )     ,  (   ⃗  )       . Then    ,    ,         , and 
 ( ⃗    )     . 
 
17. Uncovered set I 
Construct the lower contour set      ⃗    of   in the relation µ, and the binary relation   
as follows  
         ⃗         ⃗   . 
Then undominated alternatives on   are chosen, i.e.,  
   ( ⃗    )            . 
For the example above the lower contour sets for each alternative are  (   ⃗  )  
     (   ⃗  )       ,  (   ⃗  )       ,  (   ⃗  )   . Then    ,    ,    ,    . 
Consequently,  ( ⃗    )       . 
 
18. Uncovered set II 
An alternative   is said to  -dominate an alternative y (denoted as    ) if     and 
     ⃗         ⃗   , where      ⃗    is the upper contour set of   in µ. The choice consists of  
B-undominated alternatives, i.e., 
   ( ⃗    )            . 
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For the previous example the upper contour sets for each alternative are  (   ⃗  )  
       (   ⃗  )   ,  (   ⃗  )     ,  (   ⃗  )       . Then    ,    ,    . Consequently, 
 ( ⃗    )       . 
 
19. The Richelson rule 
Construct lower and upper contour sets      ⃗    and      ⃗    for each     in the 
relation µ, and the binary relation   as follows 
    {
     ⃗         ⃗       
     ⃗         ⃗       
     ⃗         ⃗            ⃗         ⃗    
 
Then undominated alternatives on   are chosen, i.e., 
   ( ⃗    )            . 
For the example above the upper and the lower contour sets for each alternative are 
 (   ⃗  )         (   ⃗  )   ,  (   ⃗  )     ,  (   ⃗  )       ,  (   ⃗  )       (   ⃗  )  
     ,  (   ⃗  )       ,  (   ⃗  )   . Then    ,    . Consequently,  ( ⃗    )       . 
 
20. The Core 
The choice includes alternatives, which are undominated via majority relation µ, i.e., 
 ( ⃗    )      |         . 
Obviously, if each alternative is dominated via majority relation µ, the core is empty. 
For the previous example the alternative b makes the core. Thus,  ( ⃗    )     . 
 
21. k-stable sets 
An alternative x belongs to Q if there exists an alternative       which dominates x 
via majority relation µ, then there exists a µ-path of length s, sk, to   from some alternative 
   . A set     is called the minimal k-stable one if none of its proper subsets is a k-stable 
set. The choice is defined as  ( ⃗    )   . If such set is not unique, then the choice is defined 
as the union of these sets. It follows from this definition that a weakly stable set is a 1-stable set. 
For the previous example let us define k-stable sets for the set X depending on the 
parameter value k. 
k  ( ⃗      ) 
k=1 {b} 
k=2 {b} 
k=3 {b} 
 
22. The threshold rule 
Let       ⃗    be the number of criteria for which the alternative   is the worst in their 
ordering,       ⃗    is the number of criteria placing   the second worst, and so on,       ⃗    is 
the number of criteria considering the alternative   as their best one. Then we order the 
alternatives lexicographically. The alternative   is said to  -dominate the alternative   if 
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  (   ⃗  )        ⃗    or, if there exists    , such that   (   ⃗  )        ⃗   ,          , 
and   (   ⃗  )        ⃗   . In other words, first, the number of worst places are compared, if 
these numbers are equal than the number of second worst places are compared, and so on. The 
alternatives which are not dominated by other alternatives via V are chosen. 
For the previous example let us calculate the value   (   ⃗  ) for each alternative     
depending on the value i. 
i   (   ⃗  )   (   ⃗  )   (   ⃗  )   (   ⃗  ) 
i=1 3 1 0 4 
i=2 2 1 4 1 
i=3 0 4 4 0 
i=4 3 2 0 3 
According to the threshold rule the alternative c is the best one as it has the fewest 
number of the worst places, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )   . As for other alternatives, the alternative b is 
better than the alternative a which is better than the alternative d.  
 
23. The Copeland rule 1 
Construct a function      ⃗   , which is equal to the difference of cardinalities of lower 
and upper contour sets of the alternative     via majority relation µ, i.e., 
 (   ⃗  )  |     ⃗   |  |     ⃗   |. 
Then the choice is defined by maximization of  (   ⃗  ), that is 
   ( ⃗    )  [       (   ⃗  )   (   ⃗  )]. 
Let us calculate for the previous example the function value      ⃗    for each alernative 
   . Then  (   ⃗  )    ,  (   ⃗  )   ,  (   ⃗  )   ,  (   ⃗  )    . 
According to the Copeland rule 1 the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )     . 
 
24. The Copeland rule 2 
The function      ⃗    is defined by cardinality of lower contour set of the alternative 
    via majority relation µ. The choice is defined by maximization of  (   ⃗  ).  
Let us define for the previous example the lower contour sets for each alternative    . 
 (   ⃗  )       (   ⃗  )       ,  (   ⃗  )       ,  (   ⃗  )   . According to the Copeland 
rule 2 the alternatives b and c will be chosen, i.e.,   ( ⃗    )       . 
 
25. The Copeland rule 3 
The function      ⃗    is defined by cardinality of upper contour set of the alternative 
    via majority relation µ. The choice is defined by minimization of  (   ⃗  ).  
For the previous example the upper contour sets for each alternative     are 
 (   ⃗  )         (   ⃗  )   ,  (   ⃗  )     ,  (   ⃗  )       . According to the Copeland 
rule 3 the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,   ( ⃗    )     . 
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26. The super-threshold choice rule 
Let the criterion      be defined over the set A, and the threshold function      over 2A 
assigning to each subset X 2A a threshold level     ,            . Define the super-threshold 
rule as follows 
   ( ⃗    )                 . 
For the previous example let us write the profile  ⃗   in the following form 
                         
a 4 4 4 2 2 1 1 1 
b 3 3 1 4 4 2 3 3 
c 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 
d 1 1 2 1 1 4 4 4 
Suppose that the choice is made on the second criterion and the threshold value is equal 
to 3. According to the super-threshold choice rule the alternatives a and b will be chosen, 
i.e.,  ( ⃗    )       . 
 
27. The minmax procedure.  
Construct the matrix     ⃗     , such that 
      ,     ⃗               ⃗    , 
where        ⃗                |      ,        ⃗       . 
The choice is defined as  
   ( ⃗    )                           ⃗    . 
For the previous example the matrix     ⃗      is the following 
 
    ⃗     = 
 a b c d 
a -∞ 3 3 5 
b 5 -∞ 6 4 
c 5 2 -∞ 5 
d 3 4 3 -∞ 
     
   
   
        ⃗     5 4 6 5 
According to the minmax procedure the alternative b will be chosen. 
 
28. The Simpson procedure 
Construct the matrix     ⃗     , such that 
      ,     ⃗               ⃗    , 
where        ⃗                |      ,  (     ⃗  )    . 
The choice is defined as 
   ( ⃗    )                           ⃗    . 
For the previous example the matrix     ⃗      is the following 
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    ⃗     = 
 a b c d     
   
        ⃗     
a +∞ 3 3 5  3 
b 5 +∞ 6 4  4 
c 5 2 +∞ 5  2 
d 3 4 3 +∞  3 
       
According to the Simpson procedure the alternative b will be chosen. 
Now let us discuss normative conditions. 
Normative conditions 
All normative conditions, which characterize different choice procedures, can be divided 
into the following groups [1, 9, 12-14] 
1. Rationality conditions; 
2. Monotonicity conditions; 
3. The non-compensatory condition. 
Rationality conditions 
There are four rationality conditions for choice functions. 
1. Heredity condition (H) 
     ϵ           ⃗     
      ⃗       
 . 
If the presented set is narrowed by eliminating some alternatives, those chosen from the 
initial set and remaining in the narrowed set will be chosen from the narrowed set. 
Example. Let           and the profile  ⃗   looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a c a b 
b b b b a 
c c a c c 
Let for the choice the inverse plurality rule is applied. According to this rule the 
alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗           
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e., 
 ⃗   , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a b a b 
b b a b a 
According to the inverse plurality rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )  
      
Thus,    ⃗     
      ⃗       
 . Hence, the inverse plurality rule does not satisfy the 
condition H. 
2. Concordance condition (С) 
       ϵ       ⃗         
          ⃗     
      ⃗      
   . 
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The Concordance condition (С) requires that all the alternatives chosen simultaneously 
from    and     be included in the choice when their union          is presented. 
Consider the previous example. According to the inverse plurality rule the alternative b 
will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗           Consider the subset  
        . A contraction of the 
profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a b a b 
b b a b a 
According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )        
Finally, let us consider the subset           . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set 
   , i.e.,  ⃗    , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a c a a 
c c a c c 
According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )        
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )         ⃗     . Thus, the inverse plurality rule does 
not satisfy the condition C. 
3. Outcast condition (O) 
     ϵ         ( ⃗    )   ( ⃗         
 )     ⃗     . 
Choice functions for which narrowing of X by rejection of some or all the alternatives not 
chosen from the initial set X does not change the choice, satisfy the condition O. 
Consider the previous example. According to the inverse plurality rule the alternative b 
will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗           Now let us consider the set  
     . A contraction of the 
profile  ⃗   onto a set    
 , i.e.,  ⃗     , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a b a b 
b b a b a 
According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.    ⃗                  
Then  ( ⃗         
 )     ⃗     . Thus, the inverse plurality rule does not satisfy the 
condition O. 
4. Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
     ϵ        {
    ( ⃗    )          ( ⃗     
 )     
    ( ⃗    )   
          ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗    )   
  
 
For the case where the choice is not empty, the condition ACA requires that the 
alternatives chosen from the initial set X and left in the narrowed one    and only such 
alternatives be chosen from   . 
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Consider the previous example. The condition ACA is not satisfied for the inverse 
plurality rule as the condition H is not satisfied for this choice procedure.  
Classical rationality includes conditions H, C and O, i.e., Heredity condition, 
Concordance condition and Outcast condition. The condition ACA is a stronger version of the 
conditions H, C, O. 
Monotonicity conditions 
1. Monotonicity condition 1 
  ϵ    ϵ ( ⃗    )   ⃗     
 ⃗⃗ ⃗                  
                 
     ϵ (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )  
Let the alternative x be chosen from initial set X. Suppose now that the relative position 
of the alternative x was improved while the relative comparison of any pair of other alternatives 
remains unchanged. The Monotonicity condition 1 is satisfied if the alternative x is still in 
choice. 
Example. Let           and the profile  ⃗   looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a c a b 
b b b b a 
c c a c c 
Let for the choice the inverse plurality rule is applied. According to this rule the 
alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗            
Consider now the profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position 
of the alternative b in   
 : 
  
    
    
    
    
  
a b c a b 
b a b b a 
c c a c c 
According to the inverse plurality rule the alternative b is chosen, i.e.,     
 ⃗⃗ ⃗          
Then      ⃗      and       
 ⃗⃗ ⃗    . Thus, the Monotonicity condition 1 is satisfied for 
this case. 
2. Monotonicity condition 2 
  ϵ        ( ⃗    )   
                       ⃗                ⃗       . 
Let two alternatives x,y be chosen from the initial set X. The Monotonicity condition 2 is 
satisfied if one of the chosen alternatives (x or y) is still in choice when the other chosen 
alternative (y or x) is eliminated. 
It is necessary to mention that since some choice procedures choose no more than one 
best alternative, the Monotonicity condition 2 is not applicable to these procedures as it considers 
the choice of more than two alternatives. In other words, such procedures obey the Monotonicity 
condition 2 trivially. 
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Example. Let           and the profile  ⃗   looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
b a a a a 
c b b b c 
a c c c b 
Let for the choice the inverse plurality rule is applied. According to this rule the 
alternatives a and b will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗              
Consider now the set          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
c a a a a 
a c c c c 
According to the inverse plurality rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )  
     
Finally, consider the set           . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e., 
 ⃗    , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
b b b b c 
c c c c b 
According to the rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )        
Then          ⃗     ,      ( ⃗     
 ) and      ( ⃗      
  ). Thus, the Monotonicity 
condition 2 is satisfied for this example. 
3. Strict monotonicity condition 
  ϵ           ( ⃗    )   ⃗     
 ⃗⃗ ⃗                  
           
    
  (   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )  [
 ( ⃗    )   
      
 ( ⃗    )      
 
The change of the relative position of unchosen alternative      ( ⃗    ) so that its 
position will be improved while the relative comparison of any pair of other alternatives remains 
unchanged leads to the choice of the alternative   or/and all alternatives that were in the initial 
choice  ( ⃗    ). 
Example. Let           and the profile  ⃗   looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 
a a b b 
c b a a 
b c c c 
Let for the choice the Borda rule is applied. The Borda counts are  (   ⃗  )   , 
 (   ⃗  )   ,  (   ⃗  )   . According to this rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e., 
   ⃗            
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Consider now the profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position 
of the alternative c in   
 : 
  
    
    
    
  
c a b b 
a b a a 
b c c c 
The Borda counts are now  (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )    (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )     (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )   . According to the 
Borda rule the alternatives a and b will be chosen, i.e.,     
 ⃗⃗ ⃗          . 
 (   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )  [
 ( ⃗    )   
      
 ( ⃗    )      
 
Thus, the Borda rule does not satisfy the strict monotonicity condition. 
The non-compensatory condition 
Consider two alternatives       that characterized by a set of criterial estimates  1(x), 
 2(x),…,  n(x) and  1(y),  2(y),…,  n(y), which may take m different values (n is the number of 
criteria). Denote by       the number of criteria for which the alternative x take value j, where 
       . 
      |                 |. 
The non-compensatory condition can be formulated as 
          {
                  
                                                         
 
In other words, low estimates on one criterion cannot be compensated by high estimates 
on other criteria. 
Example. Let           and the profile  ⃗   looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 
c a b b 
a b a a 
b c c c 
Let for the choice the Borda rule is applied. The Borda counts are  (   ⃗  )   (   ⃗  )  
   (   ⃗  )   . According to this rule the alternatives a and b will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗      
        
Now we write the profile  ⃗   in the following form 
X             
a 2 3 2 2 
b 1 2 3 3 
c 3 1 1 1 
According to the non-compensatory condition the alternative a is better than the 
alternative b while the alternative b is better than the alternative c. Thus, the non-compensatory 
condition is not satisfied as      ⃗     . 
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A study of the properties of choice procedures 
A study of the properties is conducted as follows. If a choice procedure does not satisfy 
given normative condition, a counter-example is provided. On the country, if a choice procedure 
satisfies given normative condition a necessary proof is followed. 
The results of the study of the properties are given in Theorem 1. 
Theorem 1. Information on which choice procedures satisfy given normative conditions 
is provided in Table 2. 
Table 2. Properties of existing choice procedures («+» - choice procedure satisfies given 
normative condition, «-» - choice procedure does not satisfy given normative condition) 
№ Choice procedure 
Normative conditions 
Rationality conditions 
Monotonicity 
conditions 
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1 The simple majority rule  -  -   - - 
2 The plurality rule - - - -  - - - 
3 The inverse plurality rule - - - -  - - - 
4 The q-Approval rule - - - -  - - - 
5 The run-off procedure - - - - -  - - 
6 The Hare rule (the Ware procedure) - - - - -  - - 
7 The Borda rule - - - -  - - - 
8 The Black procedure - - - -  - - - 
9 The inverse Borda rule - - - - - - - - 
10 The Nanson rule - - - - - - - - 
11 The Coombs procedure - - - - -  - - 
12 Minimal dominant set -   -  - - - 
13 Minimal undominant set - - - -  - - - 
14 Minimal weakly stable set - - - -  - - - 
15 The Fishburn rule - - - -  - - - 
16 Uncovered set I - - - -  - - - 
17 Uncovered set II -  - -  - - - 
18 The Richelson rule - - - -  - - - 
19 The Condorcet winner   - -   - - 
20 The core   - -   - - 
21 k-stable set (k>1) - - - -  - - - 
22 The threshold rule - - - -  - -  
23 The Copeland rule 1 - - - -  - - - 
24 The Copeland rule 2 - - - -  - - - 
25 The Copeland rule 3 - - - -  - - - 
26a The super-threshold rule (fixed threshold)        - 
26b The super-threshold rule (threshold depends on X) - - - -   - - 
27 The minimax procedure - - - -  - - - 
28 The Simpson procedure - - - -  - - - 
The proof of the theorem is provided in Appendix 1.  
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Conclusion 
We have studied the properties of 28 existing choice procedures, which can be used in 
various social and multi-criteria problems. It was defined which choice procedures satisfy given 
normative conditions, showing how a final choice is changed due to the changes of preferences 
or a set of feasible alternatives. Such information leads to a better understanding of different 
choice procedures and how stable and sensible is a set of alternatives obtained after applying 
some choice procedure. 
The results show that only the simple majority rule, the Condorcet winner, the core and 
the threshold rule with fixed threshold level satisfy the condition H, only minimal dominant set, 
uncovered set II, the Condorcet winner, the core and the threshold rule with fixed threshold level 
satisfy the condition С, and only the simple majority rule, minimal dominant set and the 
threshold rule with fixed threshold level satisfy the condition O. More detailed information is 
provided in Table 2.  
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Appendix 1. Properties of existing choice procedures 
1. The simple majority rule 
1.1 Heredity condition (H) 
Let  ( ⃗    )     , i.e.,  
 (   ⃗  )  
 
 
 | ⃗  |. For a contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set 
     (    ) it is true that   (   ⃗   )   
 (   ⃗  ) and | ⃗  |  | ⃗   |. Then  
 (   ⃗   )  
 
 
 
| ⃗   | and  ( ⃗     
 )     . 
Thus,  ( ⃗    )   
         ⃗     
  . The simple majority rule satisfies the condition H. 
1.2 Concordance condition (C) 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 
a b c 
b a b 
c c a 
According to the simple majority rule the choice is empty, i.e.,    ⃗          
Now let us consider the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e., 
 ⃗   , looks as  
P1 P2 P3 
a b b 
b a a 
According to the simple majority rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )       
Finally, let us consider the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e., 
 ⃗    , looks as  
P1 P2 P3 
b b c 
c c b 
According to the rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )       
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )         ⃗     . The simple majority rule does not satisfy the 
condition С. 
1.3 Outcast condition (O) 
The simple majority rule satisfies the condition O (see paragraph 1.1 of this section). 
1.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
The simple majority rule does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition C is not satisfied. 
1.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let  ( ⃗    )     , i.e.,  
 (   ⃗  )  
 
 
 | ⃗  |.  
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Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative a. Then,   (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )    (   ⃗  ) and | ⃗  |  |  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ |. Thus,   (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )  
 
 
 |  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ | and the 
alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )     . 
Since      ⃗      and       
 ⃗⃗ ⃗    , the simple majority rule satisfies the Monotonicity 
condition 1. 
1.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
Since the simple majority rule always chooses no more than one best alternative, the Monotonicity 
condition 2 is not applicable to it as it considers the choice of more than two alternatives. In other 
words, the simple majority rule obeys the Monotonicity condition 2 trivially. 
1.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 
a a b 
c b c 
b c a 
According to the simple majority rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗            
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative c in   
 : 
  
    
    
  
c a b 
a b c 
b c a 
According to the rule the choice is empty, i.e.,     
 ⃗⃗ ⃗         
 (   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )  [
 ( ⃗    )   
      
 ( ⃗    )      
 
Thus, the simple majority rule does not satisfy the strict monotonicity condition. 
1.8 The non-compensatory condition 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 
a a b 
b b c 
c c a 
According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗            
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Let us write the profile  ⃗   in the following form 
          
a 3 3 1 
b 2 2 3 
c 1 1 2 
According to the non-compensatory condition the alternative b is better than the alternative a 
while the alternative a is better than the alternative c. Thus, the non-compensatory condition is 
not satisfied as        ⃗     . 
2. The plurality rule 
2.1 Heredity condition (H) 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a c b b 
с с b a a 
b b a c c 
Let us calculate the value   (   ⃗  ) for each alternative    :  
 (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   , 
  (   ⃗  )   . According to the plurality rule the alternatives a and b will be chosen, i.e., 
   ⃗              
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a b b b 
b b a a a 
According to the rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )        
Then    ⃗     
      ⃗       
 . Thus, the plurality rule does not satisfy the condition H. 
2.2 Concordance condition (C) 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
c c c b b b d d d D a a a a 
a a a d d d b b c C b b b c 
d d d a a a c c b b c c c b 
b b b c c c a a a a d d d d 
Let us calculate the value   (   ⃗  ) for each alternative    :  
 (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   , 
  (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   . According to the plurality rule the alternatives a and d will be 
chosen, i.e.,    ⃗              
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Consider now the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks 
as  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
c c c b b b b b c c a a a a 
a a a a a a c c b b b b b c 
b b b c c c a a a a c c c b 
Let us calculate the value   (   ⃗   ) for each alternative    
 :   (   ⃗   )   ,  
 (   ⃗   )  
 ,   (   ⃗   )   . According to the plurality rule the alternatives b and c will be chosen, i.e., 
 ( ⃗     
 )         
Finally, let us consider the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e., 
 ⃗    , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
c c c b b b d d d d b b b c 
d d d d d d b b c c c c c b 
b b b c c c c c b b d d d d 
Let us calculate the value   (   ⃗    ) for each alternative    
  :   (   ⃗    )   ,  
 (   ⃗    )  
 ,   (   ⃗    )   . According to the plurality rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e., 
 ( ⃗      
  )       
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )         ⃗     . Thus, the plurality rule does not satisfy the 
condition С. 
2.3 Outcast condition (O) 
Let us consider the example from paragraph 2.1 of this section. Then  ( ⃗     
 )     ⃗     . 
Thus, the plurality rule does not satisfy the condition O. 
2.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
The plurality rule does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition H is not satisfied. 
2.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let  ( ⃗    )     , i.e.,       
 (   ⃗  )   
 (   ⃗  ). 
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative a. Then   (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )    (   ⃗  )               
 (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )    (   ⃗  ). Thus, the 
alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,       
 ⃗⃗ ⃗    , as   (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )    (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ ).  
Since      ⃗                
 ⃗⃗ ⃗    , the plurality rule satisfies the Monotonicity condition 1. 
2.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a c b b 
с c a c c 
b b b a a 
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Let us calculate the value   (   ⃗  ) for each alternative    :  
 (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   , 
  (   ⃗  )   . According to the plurality rule the alternatives a and b will be chosen, i.e., 
   ⃗              
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a c c c 
с c a a a 
According to the plurality rule the alternative c will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗     
      . 
Finally, let us consider the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e., 
 ⃗    , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
с c c b b 
b b b c c 
According to the plurality rule the alternative c will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗      
       .  
Then          ⃗     ,      ( ⃗     
 )          ( ⃗      
  ). Thus, the plurality rule does 
not satisfy the Monotonicity condition 2. 
2.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 
a a b 
с c c 
b b a 
Let us calculate the value   (   ⃗  ) for each alternative    :  
 (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   , 
  (   ⃗  )   . According to the plurality rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗      
      
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative c in   
 : 
  
    
    
  
a c b 
с a c 
b b a 
According to the rule the alternatives a,b,c will be chosen, i.e.,     
 ⃗⃗ ⃗               
 (   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )  [
 ( ⃗    )   
      
 ( ⃗    )      
 
Thus, the plurality rule does not satisfy the strict monotonicity condition. 
2.8 The non-compensatory condition 
The plurality rule does not satisfy the non-compensatory condition (see paragraph 1.8 of this 
section). 
27 
 
3. The inverse plurality rule 
3.1 Heredity condition (H) 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 
b d a 
a b d 
c a c 
d c b 
According to the inverse plurality rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗            
Consider now the subset            . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as  
P1 P2 P3 
b b a 
a a b 
According to the inverse plurality rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )        
Then    ⃗     
      ⃗       
 . Thus, the inverse plurality rule does not satisfy the condition H. 
3.2 Concordance condition (C) 
Consider the example from paragraph 3.1 of this section. According to the inverse plurality rule 
the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗           
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks 
as  
P1 P2 P3 
b d a 
a b d 
d a b 
According to the inverse plurality rule the alternatives a,b,d will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )  
         
Finally, let us consider the subset            . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , 
i.e.,  ⃗    , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 
b b c 
c c b 
According to the inverse plurality rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )        
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )         ⃗     . Thus, the inverse plurality rule does not 
satisfy the condition С. 
3.3 Outcast condition (O) 
Consider the example from paragraph 3.1 of this section.  ( ⃗     
 )     ⃗     , consequently, 
the inverse plurality rule does not satisfy the condition O. 
3.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
The inverse plurality rule does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition H is not satisfied. 
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3.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let  ( ⃗    )     , i.e.,       
 (   ⃗  )   
 (   ⃗  ). 
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative a. Then   (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )    (   ⃗  )               
 (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )    (   ⃗  ). Thus, the 
alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,       
 ⃗⃗ ⃗    , as   (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )    (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ ).  
Then      ⃗                
 ⃗⃗ ⃗    . Thus, the inverse plurality rule satisfies the Monotonicity 
condition 1. 
3.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
c c a a a c c 
a a b b b b b 
b b c c c a a 
According to the inverse plurality rule the alternatives a,b will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗             
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
c c a a a c c 
a a c c c a a 
According to the inverse plurality rule the alternative c will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗     
      . 
Finally, let us consider the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e., 
 ⃗    , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
c c b b b c c 
b b c c c b b 
According to the inverse plurality rule the alternative c will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗      
       . 
Then          ⃗     ,      ( ⃗     
 )          ( ⃗      
  ). Thus, the inverse plurality rule 
does not satisfy the Monotonicity condition 2. 
 
3.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 
c a b 
a c c 
b b a 
According to the inverse plurality rule the alternative с will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗            
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Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative b in   
 : 
  
    
    
  
c a b 
a b c 
b c a 
According to the inverse plurality rule the alternatives a,b,c will be chosen, i.e.,     
 ⃗⃗ ⃗     
          
 (   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )  [
 ( ⃗    )   
      
 ( ⃗    )      
 
Thus, the inverse plurality rule does not satisfy the strict monotonicity condition. 
 
3.8 The non-compensatory condition 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 
a a b 
b b a 
c c c 
According to the inverse plurality rule the alternatives a,b will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗              
Let us write the profile  ⃗   in the following form 
          
a 3 3 2 
b 2 2 3 
c 1 1 1 
According to the non-compensatory condition the alternative a is better than the alternative b 
while the alternative b is better than the alternative c. Thus, the non-compensatory condition is 
not satisfied as      ⃗     . 
 
4. The q-Approval rule 
The q-Approval rule satisfies the same conditions as the plurality rule regardless the value of 
parameter q. For the case  the proof is provided in paragraph 2 of this section. For the case 
    we can use the same examples but with larger number of alternatives. Let us prove it for 
the condition H. 
 
4.1 Heredity condition (H) 
Suppose the set   is finite and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a c b b 
………………………… 
b b b a a 
c c a c c 
… … … … … 
1=q
q 
                (   ⃗    )    
 𝑦  𝑋  𝑎 𝑏 𝑐  
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Let us calculate the value   (   ⃗    ) for each alternative    :  
 (   ⃗    )   , 
  (   ⃗    )   ,  
 (   ⃗    )   ,  
 (   ⃗    )   . According to the q-Approval rule the 
alternatives a and b will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗              
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a … b b 
……………b………… 
b b a a a 
… … … … … 
 
Let us calculate the value   (   ⃗     ) for each alternative    
 :   (   ⃗     )   , 
  (   ⃗     )   ,  
 (   ⃗     )   . According to the rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e., 
 ( ⃗     
   )         
Then   ⃗     
        ⃗         
 . Thus, the q-Approval rule does not satisfy the condition H. 
 
5. The run-off procedure 
5.1 Heredity condition (H) 
Let                 and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
a a b b c d e f 
b b a a b c a c 
c c c c a b b b 
d d d d d a c a 
e e e e e e d d 
f f f f f f f e 
Let us calculate the value   (   ⃗  ) for each alternative    :  
 (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   , 
  (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   .  
According to the simple majority rule the choice is empty. Consider now the subset    
            . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
a a b b b b a b 
b b a a a a b a 
Thus, according to the run-off procedure the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )        
Consider now the subset               . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e., 
 ⃗    , looks as  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8  
a a b b c c a c  
b b a a b b b b  
c c c c a a c a  
               (   ⃗     )    
q 
 𝑦  𝑋   𝑎 𝑏  
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According to the simple majority rule the choice is empty. Consider the subset              . A 
contraction of the profile  ⃗     onto a set  
   , i.e.,  ⃗     , looks as  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8  
a a a a c c a c  
c c c c a a c a  
According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, consequently,  ( ⃗      
  )       
Then    ⃗      
       ⃗       
  . Thus, the run-off procedure does not satisfy the condition H. 
 
5.2 Concordance condition (C) 
The run-off procedure does not satisfy the condition С (see paragraph 1.2 of this section). 
 
5.3 Outcast condition (O) 
The run-off procedure does not satisfy the condition O (see paragraph 5.1 of this section). 
 
5.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
The run-off procedure does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition H is not satisfied. 
5.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
a b c a b c d 
c a b c a b c 
b c a b c a b 
d d d d d d a 
According to the simple majority rule the choice is empty. Thus, the alternatives с and d are 
omitted. Consider now the subset           . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , 
i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
a b b a b b b 
b a a b a a a 
According to the rule the alternative b will be chosen, consequently,  ( ⃗    )        
Suppose now that the position of the alternative b was improved in   
  while the relative 
comparison of any pair of other alternatives remained unchanged. 
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
  
b b c a b c d 
a a b c a b c 
c c a b c a b 
d d d d d d a 
According to the simple majority rule the choice is empty. Thus, the alternatives a and d are 
omitted. Next, consider the subset            . A contraction of the profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗  onto a set    , 
i.e.,     
 ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗, looks as 
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
  
b b c c b c c 
c c b b c b b 
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According to the rule the alternative с will be chosen, i.e.,  (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )   (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗    )     . 
Then        ⃗     ,      (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ). Thus, the run-off procedure does not satisfy the 
Monotonicity condition 1. 
5.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
Since the run-off procedure always chooses no more than one best alternative, the Monotonicity 
condition 2 is not applicable to it as it considers the choice of more than two alternatives. In other 
words, the run-off procedure obeys the Monotonicity condition 2 trivially. 
 
5.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 
c c a 
a b b 
b a c 
According to the run-off procedure the alternative c will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗            
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative b in   
 : 
  
    
    
  
c b a 
a c b 
b a c 
According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,     
 ⃗⃗ ⃗           
 (   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )  [
 ( ⃗    )   
      
 ( ⃗    )      
 
Thus, the run-off procedure does not satisfy the strict monotonicity condition. 
 
5.8 The non-compensatory condition 
The run-off procedure does not satisfy the non-compensatory condition (see paragraph 1.8 of this 
section). 
 
6. The Hare rule (the Ware procedure) 
6.1 Heredity condition (H) 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
a a a c c d d 
b b b b b b b 
c c c d d a a 
d d d a a c c 
According to the Hare rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗            
Consider now the subset            . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as 
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P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
a a a b b b b 
b b b a a a a 
According to the rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )        
Then    ⃗     
      ⃗       
 . Thus, the Hare rule (the Ware procedure) does not satisfy the 
condition H. 
6.2 Concordance condition (C) 
Consider the previous example. According to the Hare rule (the Ware procedure) the alternative 
a will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗            
Consider now the subset            . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
a a a b b b b 
b b b a a a a 
According to the Hare rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )        
Finally, let us consider the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e., 
 ⃗    , looks as  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
b b b c c d d 
c c c b b b b 
d d d d d c c 
According to the rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )        
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )         ⃗     . Thus, the Hare rule (the Ware procedure) 
does not satisfy the condition С. 
6.3 Outcast condition (O) 
Consider the example from paragraph 6.1 of this section. Then  ( ⃗     
 )     ⃗     . Thus, the 
Hare rule (the Ware procedure) does not satisfy the condition O. 
6.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
The Hare rule (the Ware procedure) does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition C is not 
satisfied. 
6.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 
a a a a a c c c c d d d d 
b b b b b b b b b b b b b 
c c c c c d d d d a a a a 
d d d d d a a a a c c c c 
According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗            
Suppose now that the position of the alternative a was improved in   
  while the relative 
comparison of any pair of other alternatives remained unchanged. 
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a a a a a a c c c d d d d 
b b b b b c b b b b b b b 
c c c c c b d d d a a a a 
d d d d d d a a a c c c c 
According to the Hare rule (the Ware procedure) the alternative c is omitted on the first stage. 
Next, consider the subset         . A contraction of the profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗  onto a set   , i.e.,    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗, 
looks as 
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
     
     
     
     
  
a a a a a a b b b b b b b 
b b b b b b a a a a a a a 
According to the rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )   (   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗   )     . 
Then        ⃗     ,      (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ). Thus, the Hare rule (the Ware procedure) does not satisfy 
the Monotonicity condition 1. 
6.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
Since the Hare rule (the Ware procedure) always chooses no more than one best alternative, the 
Monotonicity condition 2 is not applicable to it as it considers the choice of more than two 
alternatives. In other words, the Hare rule (the Ware procedure) obeys the Monotonicity condition 
2 trivially. 
6.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
The Hare rule (the Ware procedure) does not satisfy the strict monotonicity condition (see the 
proof in paragraph 5.7 of this section). 
6.8 The non-compensatory condition 
The Hare rule (the Ware procedure) does not satisfy the non-compensatory condition (see 
paragraph 1.8 of this section). 
 
7. The Borda rule 
7.1 Heredity condition (H) 
Let               and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
e e a b b 
a a d c c 
b b c e a 
c c b a d 
d d e d e 
Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗  )    (   ⃗  )      (   ⃗  )     
 (   ⃗  )     (   ⃗  )    . According to the Borda rule the alternatives a,b will be chosen, i.e., 
   ⃗              
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as  
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P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
e e a b b 
a a c c c 
b b b e a 
c c e a e 
Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗   )     (   ⃗   )     (   ⃗   )  
 ,  (   ⃗   )   . According to the rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗           . 
Then    ⃗     
      ⃗       
 . Thus, the Borda rule does not satisfy the condition H. 
7.2 Concordance condition (C) 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 
a c b c 
d d a b 
b a d a 
c b c d 
Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗  )     (   ⃗  )   (   ⃗  )  
   (   ⃗  )   . According to the Borda rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗      
   . 
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks 
as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 
a c b c 
b a a b 
c b c a 
Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗   )   (   ⃗   )   (   ⃗   )   . 
According to the Borda rule the alternatives a,b,c will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗               . 
Finally, let us consider the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e., 
 ⃗    , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 
d c b c 
b d d b 
c b c d 
Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗    )   (   ⃗    )   (   ⃗    )   . 
According to the rule the alternatives b,c,d will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗                 . 
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )           ⃗     . Thus, the Borda rule does not satisfy the 
condition С. 
7.3 Outcast condition (O) 
Consider the example from paragraph 7.2 of this section. Then  ( ⃗     
 )     ⃗     , 
consequently, the Borda rule does not satisfy the condition O. 
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7.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
The Borda rule does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition H is not satisfied. 
7.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let      ⃗     , i.e.,           (   ⃗  )       ⃗   . 
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative a. Then  (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )       ⃗         (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )       ⃗   . Thus,  (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )        
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   and 
      
 ⃗⃗ ⃗    . 
     ⃗                
 ⃗⃗ ⃗    . Thus, the Borda rule satisfies the Monotonicity condition 1. 
7.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
Let                 and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
a a a f f f f c 
b b b b b b c f 
c c c a a a e e 
d d d c c c d d 
e e e d d d b a 
f f f e e e a b 
Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗  )   (   ⃗  )    ,  (   ⃗  )    , 
 (   ⃗  )      (   ⃗  )     (   ⃗  )    . According to the Borda rule the alternatives a,b will 
be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗             
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
a a a f f f f c 
c c c a a a c f 
d d d c c c e e 
e e e d d d d d 
f f f e e e a a 
Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗   )      (   ⃗   )     
 (   ⃗   )      (   ⃗   )     (   ⃗   )    . According to the Borda rule the alternative c will 
be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗           . 
Finally, let us consider the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e., 
 ⃗    , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
b b b f f f f c 
c c c b b b c f 
d d d c c c e e 
e e e d d d d d 
f f f e e e b b 
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Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗    )       (   ⃗    )      
 (   ⃗    )    ,  (   ⃗    )     (   ⃗    )    . According to the rule the alternative c will be 
chosen, i.e.,    ⃗             . 
Then          ⃗     ,      ( ⃗     
 )          ( ⃗      
  ). Thus, the Borda rule does not 
satisfy the Monotonicity condition 2. 
7.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 
a a b b 
c b a a 
b c c c 
Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗  )     (   ⃗  )     (   ⃗  )   . 
According to the Borda rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗         . 
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative c in   
 : 
  
    
    
    
  
c a b b 
a b a a 
b c c c 
Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )     (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )     (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )   . 
According to the rule the alternatives a,b will be chosen, i.e.,     
 ⃗⃗ ⃗             
 (   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )  [
 ( ⃗    )   
      
 ( ⃗    )      
 
Thus, the Borda rule does not satisfy the strict monotonicity condition. 
7.8 The non-compensatory condition 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 
a a b 
b b c 
c c a 
According to the rule the alternatives a,b will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗              
Let us write the profile  ⃗   in the following form 
          
a 3 3 1 
b 2 2 3 
c 1 1 2 
According to the non-compensatory condition the alternative b is better than the alternative a and 
the alternative a is better than the alternative c. Thus, the non-compensatory condition is not 
satisfied as      ⃗     . 
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8. The Black procedure 
8.1 Heredity condition (H) 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a d b b 
b b a d d 
d d b a a 
In this example none of alternatives is a Condorcet winner (           ). Thus, the Borda rule 
is applied. 
Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗  )     (   ⃗  )     (   ⃗  )   . 
According to the Black procedure the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )     . 
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks 
as  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a a b b 
b b b a a 
According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )        
Then    ⃗     
      ⃗       
 . Thus, the Black procedure does not satisfy the condition H. 
8.2 Concordance condition (C) 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a c d d 
d d b b b 
с с a a a 
b b d c c 
In this example none of alternatives is a Condorcet winner (                       ). Thus, 
the Borda rule is used for this case. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative: 
 (   ⃗  )     (   ⃗  )     (   ⃗  )   ,  (   ⃗  )    . According to the Black procedure the 
alternative d will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗         . 
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks 
as  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a c b b 
с с b a a 
b b a c c 
According to the Black procedure the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗           . 
Finally, let us consider the subset            . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , 
i.e.,  ⃗    , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a a d d 
d d d a a 
According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )     . 
39 
 
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )         ⃗     . Thus, the Black procedure does not satisfy 
the condition С. 
8.3 Outcast condition (O) 
Consider the example from paragraph 8.1 of this section. Then  ( ⃗     
 )     ⃗     . Thus, the 
Black procedure does not satisfy the condition O. 
8.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
The Black procedure does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition H is not satisfied. 
8.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let      ⃗     . Consider two possible situations: 
1. None of alternatives is a Condorcet winner. Thus, the Borda rule is used for this case. 
Then           (   ⃗  )       ⃗   . Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the 
profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the alternative a. Then 
 (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )       ⃗         (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )       ⃗   . Thus,  (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )        
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   and   
    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗    . 
2. The alternative a is a Condorcet winner, i.e.,     ( ⃗    ). Then         . Since 
for any profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗  which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative a the relative comparison of the alternative a and any other alternative remains 
unchanged, the alternative a will be in choice, i.e.,       
 ⃗⃗ ⃗    .  
Then      ⃗      and       
 ⃗⃗ ⃗    . Thus, the Black procedure satisfies the Monotonicity 
condition 1. 
8.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
Let               and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 
e b b a c c c a e a e d d 
a a a b d d d b b b b e b 
b c c c e e e c a c a a c 
c e e e a b a e c e c c e 
d d d d b a b d d d d b a 
In this example none of alternatives is a Condorcet winner (                   ). Thus, the 
Borda rule is used for this case. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗  )  
  (   ⃗  )      (   ⃗  )    ,  (   ⃗  )      (   ⃗  )    . According to the Black procedure 
the alternatives a,b will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗           . 
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 
e b b b c c c b e b e d d 
b c c c d d d c b c b e b 
c e e e e e e e c e c c c 
d d d d b b b d d d d b e 
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In this example none of alternatives is a Condorcet winner (               ). Thus, the Borda 
rule is used for this case. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗   )  
    (   ⃗   )      (   ⃗   )    ,  (   ⃗   )    . According to the Black procedure the 
alternative c will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗           . 
Finally, let us consider the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e., 
 ⃗    , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 
e a a a c c c a e a e d d 
a c c c d d d c a c a e c 
c e e e e e e e c e c a e 
d d d d a a a d d d d c a 
In this example none of alternatives is a Condorcet winner (               ). Thus, the Borda 
rule is used for this case. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗    )  
    (   ⃗    )    ,  (   ⃗    )    ,  (   ⃗    )    . According to the rule the alternative c 
will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )     . 
Then          ⃗     ,      ( ⃗     
 )          ( ⃗      
  ). Thus, the Black procedure 
does not satisfy the Monotonicity condition 2. 
8.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 
d a a a a c b b b 
a d d c c d c c c 
b b b d d b d d d 
c c c b b a a a a 
In this example none of alternatives is a Condorcet winner (                       ). Thus, 
the Borda rule is used for this case. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative: 
 (   ⃗  )      (   ⃗  )    (   ⃗  )    ,  (   ⃗  )    . According to the Black procedure the 
alternatives a,d will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗           . 
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative c in   
 : 
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
  
d a a c a c b b b 
a d d a c d c c c 
b b b d d b d d d 
c c c b b a a a a 
In this example none of alternatives is a Condorcet winner (                       ). Thus, 
the Borda rule is used for this case. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative: 
 (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )   (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )      (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )    ,  (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )    . According to the rule the alternatives 
c,d will be chosen, i.e.,     
 ⃗⃗ ⃗          . 
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 (   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )  [
 ( ⃗    )   
      
 ( ⃗    )      
 
Thus, the Black procedure does not satisfy the strict monotonicity condition. 
8.8 The non-compensatory condition 
The Black procedure does not satisfy the non-compensatory condition (see paragraph 1.8 of this 
section). 
9. The inverse Borda rule 
9.1 Heredity condition (H) 
Let               and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
a b c a d c 
b d a b c a 
d c b d b b 
c a d c a d 
Step 1. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:      ⃗      ,      ⃗      , 
     ⃗     ,      ⃗     . According to the Inverse Borda rule the alternative d is omitted. 
Step 2. Consider the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6  Borda count 
a b c a c c       ⃗       
b c a b b a       ⃗       
c a b c a b       ⃗       
According to the Inverse Borda rule the alternative b is omitted. 
Step 3. Consider the subset            . A contraction of the profile  ⃗    onto a set  
  , i.e., 
 ⃗    , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6  Borda count 
a c c a c c       ⃗        
c a a c a a       ⃗        
According to the Inverse Borda rule the alternative c will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗   )     . 
Consider now the subset                   . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
   , 
i.e.,  ⃗     , looks as  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6  Borda count 
d d c d d c       ⃗         
c c d c c d       ⃗         
According to the rule the alternative d will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗       
   )     . 
Then ( ⃗       
   )     ⃗          . Thus, the Inverse Borda rule does not satisfy the condition H. 
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9.2 Concordance condition (C) 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a b b c 
c b c d d 
d c d a a 
b d a c b 
Step 1. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗         )    (   ⃗         )  
  (   ⃗         )   ,      ⃗            . The alternative d is omitted. 
Step 2. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗        )     (   ⃗        )    
 (   ⃗         )   . The alternative c is omitted. 
Step 3. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗      )     (   ⃗      )   .  
According to the Inverse Borda rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )     . 
Consider now the subset                  . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , 
i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
c b b b c 
d c c d d 
b d d c b 
Step 1. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗       )   (   ⃗       )    
 (   ⃗       )   . According to the rule the alternative d is omitted. 
Step 2. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗      )     (   ⃗      )   . 
According to the Inverse Borda rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      )     . 
Finally, let us consider the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e., 
 ⃗    , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a b b d 
d b d d a 
b d a a b 
Step 1. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗    )    (   ⃗    )  
  (   ⃗    )   . According to the rule the alternatives a,b,d will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗        )  
       . 
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )         ⃗     . Thus, the Inverse Borda rule does not satisfy 
the condition С. 
9.3 Outcast condition (O) 
Consider the example from paragraph 9.1 of this section. Then  ( ⃗     
 )     ⃗     , 
consequently, the Inverse Borda rule does not satisfy the condition O. 
9.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
The Inverse Borda rule does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition H is not satisfied. 
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9.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
b c b d b a c 
a a a a c d d 
c d d c d c b 
d b c b a b a 
Step 1. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:      ⃗      ,      ⃗      , 
     ⃗      ,      ⃗      . According to the Inverse Borda rule the alternatives b and d are 
omitted. 
Step 2. Consider the subset            . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7  Borda count 
a c a a c a c       ⃗       
c a c c a c a       ⃗       
The alternative c is omitted and the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗   )     . 
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative a in   
 . 
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
  
b c b d b a c 
a a a a a d d 
c d d c c c b 
d b c b d b a 
Step 1. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:       
 ⃗⃗ ⃗     ,       
 ⃗⃗ ⃗     , 
      
 ⃗⃗ ⃗     ,       
 ⃗⃗ ⃗    . The alternative d is omitted. 
Step 2. Consider the subset          . A contraction of the profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   onto a set   , i.e.,   ⃗⃗ ⃗   , 
looks as 
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
   Borda count 
b c b a b a c        ⃗⃗ ⃗       
a a a c a c b        ⃗⃗ ⃗       
c b c b c b a        ⃗⃗ ⃗       
The alternative c is omitted. 
Step 3. Consider the subset            . A contraction of the profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   onto a set    , i.e.,   ⃗⃗ ⃗    , 
looks as 
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
   Borda count 
b a b a b a b        ⃗⃗  ⃗       
a b a b a b a        ⃗⃗  ⃗       
The alternative a is omitted. Thus, according to the rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e., 
 (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )     . 
Then        ⃗     ,      (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ). Thus, the Inverse Borda rule does not satisfy the 
Monotonicity condition 1. 
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9.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 
a a b c 
d d c b 
b c d d 
c b a a 
Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗  )    (   ⃗  )    (   ⃗  )  
     ⃗     . According to the Inverse Borda rule the alternatives a,b,c,d will be chosen, i.e., 
 ( ⃗    )           . 
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks 
as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 
d d b c 
b c c b 
c b d d 
Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗   )    (   ⃗   )         ⃗      . 
According to the rule the alternatives b,c will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      )       . 
Then        ⃗     ,      ( ⃗     
 ). Thus, the Inverse Borda rule does not satisfy the 
Monotonicity condition 2. 
9.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
The Inverse Borda rule does not satisfy the strict monotonicity condition (see the proof in 
paragraph 2.7 of this section). 
9.8 The non-compensatory condition 
The Inverse Borda rule does not satisfy the non-compensatory condition (see paragraph 1.8 of this 
section). 
10. The Nanson rule 
10.1 Heredity condition (H) 
Let               and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
a b c a d c 
b d a b c a 
d c b d b b 
c a e c a d 
e e d e e e 
Step 1. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:      ⃗      ,      ⃗      , 
     ⃗      ,      ⃗      ,      ⃗     ,  ̅( ⃗    )    . According to the Nanson rule the 
alternatives d,e are omitted. 
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Step 2. Consider the subset            . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6  Borda count 
a b c a c c       ⃗       
b c a b b a       ⃗       
c a b c a b       ⃗       
The average Borda count is equal to 6, i.e.,  ̅( ⃗     
 )   . According to the Nanson rule the 
alternative b is omitted. 
Step 3. Consider the subset            . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e.,  ⃗    , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6  Borda count 
a c c a c c       ⃗        
c a a c a a       ⃗        
The average Borda count is equal to 6, i.e.,  ̅( ⃗      
  )   . Thus, according to the Nanson rule 
the alternative c will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )     . 
Consider now the subset                     . A contraction of the profile  ⃗  onto a set     , 
i.e.,  ⃗     , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6  Borda count 
d d c d d c       ⃗         
c c d c c d       ⃗         
According to the rule the alternative d will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗       
   )     . 
Then  ( ⃗       
   )     ⃗          . Thus, the Nanson rule does not satisfy the condition H. 
10.2 Concordance condition (C) 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a b b c 
c b c d d 
b c d a a 
d d a c b 
Step 1. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗         )     (   ⃗         )  
   (   ⃗         )   ,      ⃗            ,  ̅( ⃗    )     . According to the Nanson rule the 
alternative d is omitted. 
Step 2. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗        )     (   ⃗        )    
 (   ⃗        )     ̅( ⃗                )    . According to the Nanson rule  ( ⃗    )     . 
Consider now the subset                  . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , 
i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
c b b b c 
b c c d d 
d d d c b 
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Step 1. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗       )     (   ⃗       )  
   (   ⃗       )     ̅( ⃗               )     . According to the Nanson rule the alternative d is 
omitted. 
Step 2. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗      )     (   ⃗      )   , 
 ̅( ⃗            )     . According to the Nanson rule  ( ⃗      )     . 
Finally, let us consider the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e., 
 ⃗    , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a b b d 
b b d d a 
d d a a b 
Step 1. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:  (   ⃗    )     (   ⃗    )  
   (   ⃗    )   . According to the Nanson rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e., 
 ( ⃗        )     . 
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )         ⃗     . Thus, the Nanson rule does not satisfy the 
condition С. 
10.3 Outcast condition (O) 
Consider the example from paragraph 10.1 of this section. Then  ( ⃗       
   )     ⃗     , 
consequently, the Nanson rule does not satisfy the condition O. 
10.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
The Nanson rule does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition H is not satisfied. 
10.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a c b c b 
b a c a a 
c b d d d 
d d a b c 
Step 1. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:      ⃗     ,      ⃗     , 
     ⃗     ,      ⃗     . According to the rule the alternatives a,b,c will be chosen, i.e., 
 ( ⃗   )         . 
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative a in   
 . 
  
    
    
    
    
  
a c b c a 
b a c a b 
c b d d d 
d d a b c 
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Step 1. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:       
 ⃗⃗ ⃗    ,       
 ⃗⃗ ⃗    , 
      
 ⃗⃗ ⃗    ,  (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )     ̅ (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )   . The alternatives b,d are omitted. 
Step 2. Consider the subset          . A contraction of the profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗  onto a set   , i.e.,   ⃗⃗ ⃗   , 
looks as 
  
    
    
    
    
   Borda count 
a c c c a        ⃗⃗ ⃗       
c a a a c        ⃗⃗ ⃗       
The alternative a is omitted. Thus, according to the rule the alternative c will be chosen, i.e., 
 (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )     . 
Then        ⃗     ,      (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ). Thus, the Nanson rule satisfies the Monotonicity 
condition 1. 
10.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
The Nanson rule does not satisfy the Monotonicity condition 2 (see paragraph 9.6 of this 
section). 
10.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
Consider the example from paragraph 9.7. According to the rule the alternative c will be chosen, 
i.e.,  ( ⃗    )     . Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by 
improved position of the alternative b in   
 : 
  
    
    
    
    
    
  
a b c a b c 
b d a b d a 
d c b d c b 
c a d c a d 
Step 1. Let us calculate the Borda count for each alternative:       
 ⃗⃗ ⃗     ,       
 ⃗⃗ ⃗     , 
      
 ⃗⃗ ⃗    ,  (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )   ,  ̅ (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )   . According to the Nanson rule the alternatives c and d 
are omitted. 
Step 2. Consider the subset            . A contraction of the profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗  onto a set   , i.e.,   ⃗⃗ ⃗   , 
looks as 
  
    
    
    
    
    
   Borda count 
a b a a b a        ⃗⃗ ⃗       
b a b b a b        ⃗⃗ ⃗       
According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )     . 
 (   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )  [
 ( ⃗    )   
      
 ( ⃗    )      
 
Thus, the Nanson rule does not satisfy the strict monotonicity condition. 
10.8 The non-compensatory condition 
The Nanson rule does not satisfy the non-compensatory condition (see paragraph 1.8 of this 
section). 
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11. The Coombs procedure 
11.1 Heredity condition (H) 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
c c c d d a a 
a d d b a c c 
d b b a b b b 
b a a c c d d 
According to the Coombs procedure the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗            
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
c c c b a a a 
d b b a b c с 
b a a c c b b 
  (   ⃗   )   ,  
 (   ⃗   )   ,  
 (   ⃗   )   . The alternative b is omitted.  
Thus, according to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )        
Since    ⃗     
      ⃗       
 , the Coombs procedure does not satisfy the condition H. 
11.2 Concordance condition (C) 
Consider the previous example. According to the Coombs procedure    ⃗         , 
 ( ⃗     
 )     . 
Consider now the subset           . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e.,  ⃗    , 
looks as  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
c c c d d a a 
a d d a a c c 
d a a c c d d 
  (   ⃗    )   ,  
 (   ⃗    )   ,  
 (   ⃗    )   . The alternative d is omitted.  
Thus, according to the rule the alternatives a and c will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )  
       Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )         ⃗     . Thus, the Coombs procedure does not 
satisfy the condition С. 
 
11.3 Outcast condition (O) 
Consider the example from paragraph 11.1 of this section. Then  ( ⃗     
 )     ⃗     , 
consequently, the Coombs procedure does not satisfy the condition O. 
 
11.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
The Coombs procedure does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition H is not satisfied. 
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11.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
a c c c c a a a 
c a b b b b b b 
b b a a a c c c 
According to the rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗   )     . 
Suppose now that the position of the alternative b was improved in   
  while the relative 
comparison of any pair of other alternatives remained unchanged. 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
a c c c c a a a 
b a b b b b b b 
c b a a a c c c 
  (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   ,  
 (   ⃗  )   . According to the Coombs procedure the alternative 
c is omitted. Next, consider the subset          . A contraction of the profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗  onto a set   , 
i.e.,   ⃗⃗ ⃗   , looks as 
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
  
a a b b b a a a 
b b a a a b b b 
According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )   (   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗   )     . 
Then        ⃗     ,      (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ). Thus, the Coombs procedure does not satisfy the 
Monotonicity condition 1. 
 
11.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
c c c a a a 
d b d d b b 
a d b b d c 
b a a c c d 
According to the Coombs procedure the alternatives b and d will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗      
        
Consider the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
c c c a a a 
d d d d d c 
a a a c c d 
  (   ⃗   )   ,  
 (   ⃗   )   ,  
 (   ⃗   )   . According to the Coombs procedure the 
alternative a is omitted. Next, consider the subset            . A contraction of the profile  ⃗    
onto a set    , i.e.,  ⃗    , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
c c c d d c 
d d d c c d 
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According to the Coombs procedure the alternative c will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )  
 ( ⃗      
  )        
Finally, consider the subset            . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
c c c a a a 
a b b b b b 
b a a c c c 
  (   ⃗     )   ,  
 (   ⃗     )   ,  
 (   ⃗     )   . According to the Coombs procedure the 
alternative c is omitted.  
Next, consider the subset                . A contraction of the profile  ⃗      onto a set  
    , i.e., 
 ⃗      , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
a b b a a a 
b a a b b b 
According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗       
   )   ( ⃗        
    )  
     Then          ⃗     ,      ( ⃗            )          ( ⃗            ). Thus, the 
Coombs procedure does not satisfy the Monotonicity condition 2. 
 
11.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
The Coombs procedure does not satisfy the strict monotonicity condition (see paragraph 3.7 of 
this section). 
11.8 The non-compensatory condition 
The Coombs procedure does not satisfy the non-compensatory condition (see paragraph 2.8 of this 
section). 
12. Minimal dominant set 
12.1 Heredity condition (H) 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 
a c b 
b a c 
c b a 
For this case a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
 a b c 
a - 1 0 
b 0 - 1 
c 1 0 - 
According to the rule the alternatives a,b,c are included in minimal dominant set Q. Thus, 
 ( ⃗    )           . 
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Consider now the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 
a c c 
c a a 
According to the rule the alternative c will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )     . 
Then    ⃗     
      ⃗       
 . Thus, the condition H is not satisfied. 
12.2 Concordance condition (C) 
The condition С is satisfied if        ϵ      ⃗         
          ⃗     
      ⃗      
   . 
Let us proof it by contradiction.  
1. Suppose that     ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )       ⃗         
      . Then    
   ⃗         
          . It is also true that      and/or      . 
2. Let     . Since    ( ⃗     
 ),        ( ⃗     
 )     . Thus,    ( ⃗     
 ) and 
   . 
3. The alternatives x and y can be chosen from the set    iff     ( ⃗     
 )     and    . 
4. Since     and          ⃗         
      ,      ⃗         
      . Thus,     which 
is a contradiction. Thus, the assumption 1 is incorrect. 
Thus, the condition C is satisfied. 
 
12.3 Outcast condition (O) 
The condition O is satisfied (the proof follows from definition of the rule). 
12.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
Minimal dominant set does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition H is not satisfied. 
 
12.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let    ( ⃗    ). Then       ( ⃗    )            
   ( ⃗    )          
         
        . Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position 
of the alternative a. Then              ( ⃗    )          
                 . 
Consequently,    (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ). Thus, the Monotonicity condition 1 is satisfied. 
12.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
The Monotonicity condition 2 is not satisfied (see paragraph 12.1 of this section). 
12.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
The strict monotonicity condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.7 of this section). 
12.8 The non-compensatory condition 
The non-compensatory condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.8 of this section). 
52 
 
13. Minimal undominated set 
13.1 Heredity condition (H) 
The condition H is not satisfied (see paragraph 12.1 of this section). 
13.2 Concordance condition (C) 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
b a a b a d 
a c d a c b 
c d b c d c 
d b c d b a 
For this case a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
 a b c d 
a - 0 1 1 
b 0 - 1 0 
c 0 0 - 1 
d 0 1 0 - 
According to the rule the alternative a is included in minimal undominated set Q. Thus, 
 ( ⃗    )       . Consider now the subset  
        . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a 
set   , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
b c d b c d 
c d b c d b 
d b c d b c 
According to the rule the alternatives b,c,d make the minimal undominated set. Thus, 
 ( ⃗     
 )         . 
Finally, consider the subset             . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e., 
 ⃗    , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
b a a b a b 
a b b a b a 
According to the rule the alternatives a and b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )       . 
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )         ⃗     . Thus, the condition С is not satisfied. 
13.3 Outcast condition (O) 
Consider the previous example. Then  ( ⃗    )   ( ⃗      
  ). Thus, the condition O is not 
satisfied. 
13.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
Minimal undominated set does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition H is not satisfied. 
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13.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let    ( ⃗    ). Then       ( ⃗    )            
   ( ⃗    )          
         
        . Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position 
of the alternative a. Then       ( ⃗    )            
   ( ⃗    )          
         
        . Thus,    (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ). The Monotonicity condition 1 is satisfied. 
13.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
The Monotonicity condition 2 is not satisfied (see paragraph 12.1 of this section). 
13.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
The strict monotonicity condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.7 of this section). 
13.8 The non-compensatory condition 
The non-compensatory condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.8 of this section). 
14. Minimal weakly stable set 
14.1 Heredity condition (H) 
The condition H is not satisfied (see paragraph 12.1 of this section). 
14.2 Concordance condition (C) 
Let               and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
 a b c d e 
a - 1 0 0 0 
b 0 - 1 0 0 
c 0 0 - 1 1 
d 1 0 0 - 0 
e 0 0 0 1 - 
According to the rule the alternatives a and c are included in minimal weakly stable set Q. Thus, 
 ( ⃗    )         . 
Consider now the subset          . Then a matrix of majority relation µ is the following  
 a b c d 
a - 1 0 0 
b 0 - 1 0 
c 0 0 - 1 
d 1 0 0 - 
According to the rule the alternatives a,b,c,d are included in minimal weakly stable set, i.e., 
 ( ⃗     
 )             
Finally, consider the subset           . Then a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
 b c d e 
b - 1 0 0 
c 0 - 1 1 
d 0 0 - 0 
e 0 0 1 - 
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According to the rule the alternative b is included in minimal weakly stable set, i.e., 
 ( ⃗      
  )       
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )         ⃗     . Thus, the condition С is not satisfied. 
14.3 Outcast condition (O) 
Consider the previous example.  ( ⃗      
  )     ⃗     , consequently, the condition O is not 
satisfied. 
14.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
Minimal weakly stable set does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition H is not satisfied. 
14.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let    ( ⃗    ). Then 
{
                                             
             |    |  |   |                                         
 
where     ( ⃗    )                   
                                  
               . 
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative a. Then the cardinality of a set     which includes the alternative a is reduced or 
remained the same while the cardinality of a set      is higher than the cardinality of a set    . 
Thus,    (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ) and the Monotonicity condition 1 is satisfied. 
14.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
The Monotonicity condition 2 is not satisfied (see paragraph 12.1 of this section). 
14.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
The strict monotonicity condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.7 of this section). 
14.8 The non-compensatory condition 
The non-compensatory condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.8 of this section). 
15. The Fishburn rule 
15.1 Heredity condition (H) 
Condition H is not satisfied (see paragraph 12.1 of this section). 
15.2 Concordance condition (C) 
Let               and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
 a b c d e f 
a - 1 0 0 1 1 
b 0 - 1 1 0 1 
c 1 0 - 1 1 0 
d 1 0 0 - 0 0 
e 0 0 0 1 - 1 
f 0 0 1 1 0 - 
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Let us define the upper contour sets for each alternative.  (   ⃗  )         (   ⃗  )     , 
 (   ⃗  )       ,  (   ⃗  )           ,  (   ⃗  )       ,  (   ⃗  )         . Then    , 
   ,    . Thus,  ( ⃗    )         . 
Consider now the subset            . Then a matrix of majority relation µ is the following  
 a b d e 
a - 1 0 1 
b 0 - 1 0 
d 1 0 - 0 
e 0 0 1 - 
Let us define the upper contour sets for each alternative.  (   ⃗   )       (   ⃗   )     , 
 (   ⃗   )       ,  (   ⃗   )     . Thus,  ( ⃗     
 )           . 
Finally, consider the subset             . Then a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
 c d e f 
c - 1 1 0 
d 0 - 0 0 
e 0 1 - 1 
f 1 1 0 - 
Let us define the upper contour sets for each alternative.  (   ⃗    )     ,  (   ⃗    )  
       ,  (   ⃗    )     ,  (   ⃗    )     . Then    ,    ,    . Thus,  ( ⃗      
  )         . 
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )         ⃗     . Thus, the condition С is not satisfied. 
15.3 Outcast condition (O) 
Let               and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
 a b c d e 
a - 1 0 1 1 
b 0 - 1 1 0 
c 1 0 - 1 0 
d 0 0 0 - 1 
e 0 0 0 0 - 
Let us define the upper contour sets for each alternative.  (   ⃗  )       (   ⃗  )     , 
 (   ⃗  )     ,  (   ⃗  )         ,  (   ⃗  )       . Then    ,    . Thus,  ( ⃗    )  
       . 
Consider now the subset          . Then a matrix of majority relation µ is the following  
 a b c e 
a - 1 0 1 
b 0 - 1 0 
c 1 0 - 0 
e 0 0 0 - 
Let us define the upper contour sets for each alternative.  (   ⃗   )       (   ⃗   )     , 
 (   ⃗   )     ,  (   ⃗   )     . Thus,  ( ⃗     
 )           . 
Then  ( ⃗     
 )     ⃗     , Thus, the condition O is not satisfied. 
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15.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
The Fishburn rule does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition H is not satisfied. 
15.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let    ( ⃗    ). Then          ⃗     (   ⃗  ). 
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative a. Then (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )   (   ⃗  )               (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )   (   ⃗  ). Thus,      
      
 ⃗⃗ ⃗    (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ ). Thus,    (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ) and monotonicity condition 1 is satisfied.  
15.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
The Monotonicity condition 2 is not satisfied (see paragraph 12.1 of this section). 
15.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
The strict monotonicity condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.7 of this section). 
15.8 The non-compensatory condition 
The non-compensatory condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.8 of this section). 
16. Uncovered set I 
16.1 Heredity condition (H) 
The condition H is not satisfied (see paragraph 12.1 of this section). 
16.2 Concordance condition (C) 
Let                 and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
 a b c d e f 
a - 1 0 0 1 1 
b 0 - 1 1 0 1 
c 1 0 - 1 1 0 
d 1 0 0 - 0 0 
e 0 0 0 1 - 1 
f 0 0 1 1 0 - 
Let us define the lower contour sets for each alternative.  (   ⃗  )           (   ⃗  )  
       ,  (   ⃗  )         ,  (   ⃗  )     ,  (   ⃗  )       ,  (   ⃗  )       . Then    , 
   ,    . Thus,  ( ⃗    )         . 
Consider now the subset            . Then a matrix of majority relation µ is the following  
 a b d e 
a - 1 0 1 
b 0 - 1 0 
d 1 0 - 0 
e 0 0 1 - 
Let us define the lower contour sets for each alternative.  (   ⃗   )         (   ⃗   )     , 
 (   ⃗   )     ,  (   ⃗   )     . Thus,  ( ⃗     
 )           . 
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Finally, consider the subset             . Then a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
 c d e f 
c - 1 1 0 
d 0 - 0 0 
e 0 1 - 1 
f 1 1 0 - 
Let us define the lower contour sets for each alternative.  (   ⃗    )       ,  (   ⃗    )   , 
 (   ⃗    )       ,  (   ⃗    )       . Then    ,    ,    . Thus,  ( ⃗      
  )         . 
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )         ⃗     . Thus, the condition С is not satisfied. 
16.3 Outcast condition (O) 
Let               and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
 a b c d e 
a - 0 1 1 0 
b 1 - 0 1 0 
c 0 1 - 1 1 
d 0 0 0 - 1 
e 1 0 0 0 - 
Let us define the lower contour sets for each alternative.  (   ⃗  )         (   ⃗  )       , 
 (   ⃗  )         ,  (   ⃗  )     ,  (   ⃗  )     . Then    ,    . Thus,  ( ⃗    )  
       . 
Consider now the subset          . Then a matrix of majority relation µ is the following  
 a b c e 
a - 0 1 0 
b 1 - 0 0 
c 0 1 - 1 
e 1 0 0 - 
Let us define the lower contour sets for each alternative.  (   ⃗   )       (   ⃗   )     , 
 (   ⃗   )       ,  (   ⃗   )     . Thus,  ( ⃗     
 )           . 
Then  ( ⃗     
 )     ⃗     , Thus, the condition O is not satisfied. 
16.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
Uncovered set I does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition H is not satisfied. 
16.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let    ( ⃗    ). Then           ⃗     (   ⃗  ). 
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative a. Then (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )   (   ⃗  )               (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )   (   ⃗  ). Thus,    
        
 ⃗⃗ ⃗    (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ ). Consequently,    (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ) and monotonicity condition 1 is satisfied. 
16.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
The Monotonicity condition 2 is not satisfied (see paragraph 12.1 of this section). 
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16.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
The strict monotonicity condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.7 of this section). 
16.8 The non-compensatory condition 
The non-compensatory condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.8 of this section). 
17. Uncovered set II 
17.1 Heredity condition (H) 
The condition H is not satisfied (see paragraph 12.1 of this section). 
17.2 Concordance condition (C) 
The condition С is satisfied iff        ϵ      ⃗         
          ⃗     
      ⃗      
   . 
Let us proof it by contradiction.  
1. Suppose that     ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )       ⃗         
      . Then    
   ⃗         
                   ⃗         ⃗   . Moreover,    
  and/or      . 
2. Let     . Since    ,      ⃗          ⃗    . Thus,    ( ⃗     
 )        ( ⃗     
 ) 
which is a contradiction. Consequently, the assumption 1 is incorrect. 
Thus, Uncovered set II satisfies condition C. 
17.3 Outcast condition (O) 
Let               and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
 a b c d 
a - 0 1 0 
b 1 - 0 0 
c 0 0 - 1 
d 1 1 0 - 
Let us define the upper contour sets for each alternative.  (   ⃗  )         (   ⃗  )     , 
 (   ⃗  )     ,  (   ⃗  )     . Then    . Thus,  ( ⃗    )         . 
Consider now the subset          . Then a matrix of majority relation µ is the following  
 b c d 
b - 0 0 
c 0 - 1 
d 1 0 - 
Let us define the upper contour sets for each alternative.  (   ⃗   )       (   ⃗   )   , 
 (   ⃗   )     . Thus,  ( ⃗     
 )       . 
Then  ( ⃗     
 )     ⃗     , Thus, the condition O is not satisfied. 
17.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
Uncovered set II does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition H is not satisfied. 
17.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let    ( ⃗    ). Then               ⃗     (   ⃗  ). 
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Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative a. Then (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )   (   ⃗  )               (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )   (   ⃗  ). Thus,    
            
 ⃗⃗ ⃗    (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ ). Thus,    (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ) and monotonicity condition 1 is satisfied. 
17.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
The Monotonicity condition 2 is not satisfied (see paragraph 12.1 of this section). 
17.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
The strict monotonicity condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.7 of this section). 
17.8 The non-compensatory condition 
The non-compensatory condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.8 of this section). 
18. The Richelson rule 
18.1 Heredity condition (H) 
The condition H is not satisfied (see paragraph 12.1 of this section). 
18.2 Concordance condition (C) 
The condition C is not satisfied (see paragraph 15.2 of this section). 
18.3 Outcast condition (O) 
The condition O is not satisfied (see paragraph 15.3 of this section). 
18.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
The Richelson rule does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition H is not satisfied. 
18.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
The Monotonicity condition 1 is satisfied (see paragraph 15.5 and 16.5 of this section). 
18.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
The Monotonicity condition 2 is not satisfied (see paragraph 12.1 of this section). 
18.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
The strict monotonicity condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.7 of this section). 
18.8 The non-compensatory condition 
The non-compensatory condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.8 of this section). 
19. The Condorcet winner  
19.1 Heredity condition (H) 
Since a contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto any set  
    does not affect the pairwise comparison 
of any alternatives,  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗    ) if  ( ⃗    )   . Consequently,    ⃗     
   
   ⃗       
  and condition H is satisfied. 
19.2 Concordance condition (C) 
The condition С is satisfied iff        ϵ      ⃗         
          ⃗     
      ⃗      
   . 
Let us proof it by contradiction.  
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1. Suppose that     ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )       ⃗         
      . Then    
 ( ⃗         
     )        ⃗         
          . Moreover,      and/or   
   . 
2. Let     . Since    ,    ( ⃗     
 ) which is a contradiction. Thus, the assumption 1 
is incorrect. 
Thus, the condition C is satisfied. 
19.3 Outcast condition (O) 
The condition O is not satisfied as the choice  ( ⃗     
 ) of the subset      can be non-empty 
when  ( ⃗    )   . 
19.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
The condition ACA is not satisfied since the first condition of the axiom (    ( ⃗    )     then 
 ( ⃗     
 )    ) is not satisfied. 
19.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
The Monotonicity condition 1 is satisfied since the advancement of the chosen alternative does not 
worsen its pairwise comparison with other alternatives. 
19.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
Since the Condorcet winner always chooses no more than one best alternative, the Monotonicity 
condition 2 is not applicable to it as it considers the choice of more than two alternatives. In other 
words, the Condorcet winner obeys the Monotonicity condition 2 trivially. 
19.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
The strict monotonicity condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.7 of this section). 
19.8 The non-compensatory condition 
The non-compensatory condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.8 of this section). 
20. The core 
20.1 Heredity condition (H) 
Let us proof it by contradiction. Suppose that       ⃗       
        ⃗     
  . Then 
         . Since            ,    ( ⃗    ) which is a contradition. Thus, the previous 
assumption is incorrect and, consequently, the condition H is satisfied. 
20.2 Concordance condition (C) 
The condition C is satisfied (see paragraph 20.1 of this section). 
20.3 Outcast condition (O) 
Let           and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
 a b c 
a - 0 1 
b 0 - 0 
c 0 1 - 
According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )     . 
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Consider now the subset          . Then a matrix of majority relation µ is the following  
 a b 
a - 0 
b 0 - 
According to the rule the alternatives a and b will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗                
Then  ( ⃗     
 )     ⃗     . Thus, the condition O is not satisfied. 
20.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
The core does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition O is not satisfied. 
20.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
The Monotonicity condition 1 is satisfied since the advancement of the chosen alternative does not 
worsen its pairwise comparison with other alternatives. 
20.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
The Monotonicity condition 2 is not satisfied (see paragraph 20.1 of this section). 
20.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
The strict monotonicity condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.7 of this section). 
20.8 The non-compensatory condition 
The non-compensatory condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.8 of this section). 
21. k-stable set 
To check the properties of k-stable set similar examples with the paragraph 14 of this section can 
be used. For the case     properties of k-stable set are equal to the properties of minimal 
weakly stable set (see paragraph 14 of this section). For the case     we can use examples that 
differs from the paragraph 14 of this section by the addition of k-1 extra vertices (i.e., 
alternatives) to each edge between alternatives of minimal weakly stable set. 
Let us show it for an example from the paragraph 14.2 of this section. Let               and 
a majority graph is the following 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the case    , the alternatives a and c will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      )       . 
Transform this majority graph for the case     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
… … 
… 
a 
b 
c 
e d 
a 
b 
c 
e d 
р 
р 
р (k-1) additional alternatives on each edge 
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For the case    , the alternatives a and c will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      )       . 
22. The threshold rule 
22.1 Heredity condition (H) 
The condition H is not satisfied (see paragraph 12.1 of this section). 
22.2 Concordance condition (C) 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 
a b b 
c a a 
b c c 
According to the threshold rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗         . 
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , looks 
as  
P1 P2 P3 
c b b 
b c c 
According to the threshold rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗           . 
Finally, let us consider the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e., 
 ⃗    , looks as 
P1 P2 P3 
a b b 
b a a 
According to the rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗             . 
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )         ⃗     . Thus, the condition С is not satisfied. 
22.3 Outcast condition (O) 
Consider the example from paragraph 22.2 of this section. Then  ( ⃗      
  )     ⃗     . Thus, 
the condition O is not satisfied. 
22.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
The threshold rule does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition H is not satisfied. 
22.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let      ⃗     . Then             . 
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative a. Then             . Thus,       
 ⃗⃗ ⃗    . 
     ⃗                
 ⃗⃗ ⃗    . Thus, threshold rule satisfies the Monotonicity condition 1. 
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22.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
a b b b b d 
d d c c a a 
c a d a d c 
b c a d c b 
According to the threshold rule the alternatives a,d will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗             
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
a b b b b a 
c a c c a c 
b c a a c b 
According to the threshold rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗           . 
Finally, consider the subset           . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e.,  ⃗    , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
d b b b b d 
c d c c d c 
b c d d c b 
According to the threshold rule the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗             . 
Then          ⃗     ,      ( ⃗     
 )          ( ⃗      
  ). Thus, threshold rule does not 
satisfy the Monotonicity condition 2. 
22.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
The threshold rule does not satisfy the strict monotonicity condition (see paragraph 1.7 of this 
section). 
22.8 The non-compensatory condition 
The non-compensatory condition is satisfied by the definition of the rule. 
23. The Copeland rule 1 
23.1 Heredity condition (H) 
The condition H is not satisfied (see paragraph 12.1 of this section). 
23.2 Concordance condition (C) 
Let               and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
 a b c d e 
a - 1 0 1 1 
b 0 - 1 0 1 
c 1 0 - 0 0 
d 0 0 1 - 1 
e 0 0 1 0 - 
According to the Copeland rule 1 the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )     . 
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Consider now the subset          . Then a matrix of majority relation µ is the following  
 a c d e 
a - 0 1 1 
c 1 - 0 0 
d 0 1 - 1 
e 0 1 0 - 
According to the Copeland rule 1 the alternatives a and d will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )  
     . 
Finally, consider the subset           . Then a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
 b c d e 
b - 1 0 1 
c 0 - 0 0 
d 0 1 - 1 
e 0 1 0 - 
According to the rule the alternatives b and d will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )       . 
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )         ⃗     . Thus, the condition С is not satisfied. 
23.3 Outcast condition (O) 
Consider the previous example.  ( ⃗    )       ( ⃗     
 ). Thus, the condition O is not 
satisfied. 
23.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
The Copeland rule 1 does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition H is not satisfied. 
23.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let    ( ⃗    ). Then       (   ⃗  )   (   ⃗  ). 
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative a. Then (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )   (   ⃗  )              (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )   (   ⃗  ). Thus,    
   (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )   (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ ). Consequently,    (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ) and monotonicity condition 1 is satisfied. 
23.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
The Monotonicity condition 2 is not satisfied (see paragraph 12.1 of this section). 
23.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
The strict monotonicity condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.7 of this section). 
23.8 The non-compensatory condition 
The non-compensatory condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.8 of this section). 
24. The Copeland rule 2 
24.1 Heredity condition (H) 
The condition H is not satisfied (see paragraph 12.1 of this section). 
24.2 Concordance condition (C) 
The condition C is not satisfied (see paragraph 23.2 of this section). 
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24.3 Outcast condition (O) 
The condition O is not satisfied (see paragraph 23.3 of this section). 
24.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
Copeland rule 2 does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition H is not satisfied. 
24.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let    ( ⃗    ). Then      | (   ⃗  )|  | (   ⃗  )|. 
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative a. Then | (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ ) |  | (   ⃗  )|              | (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ ) |  | (   ⃗  )|. Thus, 
     | (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )|  | (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ ) |. Consequently,    (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ) and monotonicity condition 1 is 
satisfied. 
24.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
The Monotonicity condition 2 is not satisfied (see paragraph 12.1 of this section). 
24.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
The strict monotonicity condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.7 of this section). 
24.8 The non-compensatory condition 
The non-compensatory condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.8 of this section). 
25. The Copeland rule 3 
25.1 Heredity condition (H) 
The condition H is not satisfied (see paragraph 12.1 of this section). 
25.2 Concordance condition (C) 
Let                 and a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
 a b c d e f 
a - 1 0 0 1 1 
b 0 - 1 1 0 1 
c 1 0 - 1 1 0 
d 1 0 0 - 0 0 
e 0 0 0 1 - 1 
f 0 0 1 1 0 - 
According to the Copeland rule 3 the alternative b will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗    )     . 
Consider now the subset            . Then a matrix of majority relation µ is the following  
 a b d e 
a - 1 0 1 
b 0 - 1 0 
d 1 0 - 0 
e 0 0 1 - 
According to the Copeland rule 3 the alternatives a,b,e will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )  
       . 
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Finally, consider the subset             . Then a matrix of majority relation µ is the following 
 c d e f 
c - 1 1 0 
d 0 - 0 0 
e 0 1 - 1 
f 1 1 0 - 
According to the rule the alternatives c,e,f will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )         . 
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )         ⃗     . Thus, the condition С is not satisfied. 
25.3 Outcast condition (O) 
Consider the previous example.  ( ⃗    )       ( ⃗     
 ). Thus, the condition O is not 
satisfied. 
25.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
The Copeland rule 3 does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition H is not satisfied. 
25.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let    ( ⃗    ). Then      | (   ⃗  )|  | (   ⃗  )|. 
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative a. Then | (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )|  | (   ⃗  )|              | (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )|  | (   ⃗  )|. Thus, 
     | (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )|  | (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ ) |. Consequently,    (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ) and monotonicity condition 1 is 
satisfied. 
25.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
The Monotonicity condition 2 is not satisfied (see paragraph 12.1 of this section). 
25.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
The strict monotonicity condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.7 of this section). 
25.8 The non-compensatory condition 
The non-compensatory condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.8 of this section). 
26a. The super-threshold rule (fixed threshold) 
The super-threshold rule with fixed threshold value chooses alternatives for which the criterion 
value is more or less than some fixed threshold value. Hence, the results of such choice 
procedure do not depend on the initial set X. Thus, the super-threshold choice rule with fixed 
threshold value satisfies all given condition except the non-compensatory condition (see 
paragraph 1.8 of this section). 
26b. The super-threshold rule (threshold depends on X) 
26.1 Heredity condition (H) 
The condition H is satisfied iff      ϵ           ⃗     
      ⃗       
 . Let us proof it 
by contradiction.  
Suppose that the condition H is not satisfied, i.e.,     ( ⃗    )   
       ⃗     
  . Then 
     ⃗         ⃗            ⃗        
   ⃗    . In other words, there should be a subset 
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     such that the threshold value       ⃗     will be more that      ⃗    and some alternative   
will not be chosen. Obviously, this situation may occur, consequently, the condition H is not 
satisfied. 
26.2 Concordance condition (C) 
The condition C is not satisfied (see paragraph 26.1 of this section). 
26.3 Outcast condition (O) 
The condition O is not satisfied (see paragraph 26.1 of this section). 
26.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
The condition ACA is not satisfied as the condition H is not satisfied. 
26.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let    ( ⃗    ). Then      ⃗         ⃗   . Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the 
profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the alternative a. Then       
 ⃗⃗ ⃗         
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   since 
      
 ⃗⃗ ⃗        ⃗     (    
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )       ⃗   . Thus, the Monotonicity condition 1 is satisfied. 
26.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
Let {      ( ⃗    ). Then      ⃗         ⃗            ⃗         ⃗   . By definition it is 
obvious that the threshold value does not increase when one of the chosen alternative is 
eliminated. Consequently,      ⃗                 ⃗                ⃗                 ⃗       . 
Then          ⃗     ,      ( ⃗            )          ( ⃗            ). Thus, the 
Monotonicity condition 2 is satisfied. 
26.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
The super-threshold rule with the threshold value that depends on X does not satisfy the strict 
monotonicity condition (see paragraph 26.1 of this section). 
26.8 The non-compensatory condition 
The non-compensatory condition is not satisfied (see paragraph 1.8 of this section). 
27. The minimax procedure 
27.1 Heredity condition (H) 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
a a a a b b b c c c 
b b b b c c c a a a 
c c c c a a a b b b 
Let us construct a matrix     ⃗      for the profile  ⃗  . 
 a b c 
a - 6 8 
b 7 - 5 
c 5 8 - 
According to the minimax procedure the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗           
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Consider now the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
a a a a c c c c c c 
c c c c a a a a a a 
According to the rule the alternative c will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )       
Then    ⃗     
      ⃗       
 . Thus, the condition H is not satisfied. 
27.2 Concordance condition (C) 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 
d a a a a c b b b d a 
a d d c c d c c c a d 
b b b d d b d d d b b 
c c c b b a a a a c c 
Let us construct a matrix     ⃗      for the profile  ⃗  . 
 a b c d 
a - 5 5 4 
b 4 - 6 3 
c 4 3 - 6 
d 5 6 3 - 
According to the minimax procedure the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗           
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 
d a a a a d b b b d a 
a d d d d b d d d a d 
b b b b b a a a a b b 
Let us construct a matrix     ⃗     
   for the profile  ⃗   . 
 a b d 
a - 5 4 
b 4 - 3 
d 5 6 - 
According to the minimax procedure the alternative d will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )       
Finally, consider the subset           . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
  , i.e.,  ⃗    , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 
d d d c c c b b b d d 
b b b d d d c c c b b 
c c c b b b d d d c c 
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Let us construct a matrix     ⃗      
    for the profile  ⃗    . 
 b c d 
b - 6 3 
c 3 - 6 
d 6 3 - 
According to the rule the alternatives b,c,d will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗      
  )           
Then  ( ⃗     
 )   ( ⃗      
  )         ⃗     . Thus, the condition С is not satisfied. 
27.3 Outcast condition (O) 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a d b b 
b b a d d 
d d b a a 
Let us construct a matrix     ⃗      for the profile  ⃗   
 a b d 
a - 3 2 
b 2 - 4 
d 3 1 - 
According to the minimax procedure the alternatives a,b will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗             
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
a a a b b 
b b b a a 
Let us construct a matrix     ⃗     
   for the profile  ⃗    
 a b 
a - 3 
b 2 - 
According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )       
Then  ( ⃗     
 )     ⃗     . Thus, the condition O is not satisfied. 
27.4 Arrow’s choice axiom (ACA) 
The minimax procedure does not satisfy the condition ACA as the condition H is not satisfied. 
27.5 Monotonicity condition 1 
Let                          ⃗    , i.e.,    ( ⃗    ).  
Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative a. Then             (      
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )         ⃗   ,  (      
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )         ⃗   , 
 (      
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )         ⃗         (      
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ )         ⃗   . Thus, 
                          
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   , i.e.,    (  
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   ).  
Then      ⃗                
 ⃗⃗ ⃗    . Thus, the Monotonicity condition 1 is satisfied. 
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27.6 The Monotonicity condition 2 
Let             and the profile  ⃗   looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 
d a a a a c b b b d a 
a d d c c d c c c a d 
b b b d d b d d d b b 
c c c b b a a a a c c 
Let us construct a matrix     ⃗      for the profile  ⃗   
 a b c d 
a - 3 2 1 
b 1 - 3 2 
c 2 1 - 3 
d 3 2 1 - 
According to the minimax procedure the alternatives a,b,c,d will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗      
           
Consider now the subset          . A contraction of the profile  ⃗   onto a set  
 , i.e.,  ⃗   , 
looks as 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 
a a a a a c b b b a a 
b b b c c b c c c b b 
c c c b b a a a a c c 
Let us construct a matrix     ⃗     
   for the profile  ⃗    
 a b c 
a - 3 2 
b 1 - 3 
c 2 1 - 
According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,  ( ⃗     
 )       
Then          ⃗                 ( ⃗     
 ). Thus, the Monotonicity condition 2 is not 
satisfied. 
27.7 The strict monotonicity condition 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   looks as 
P1 P2 P3 
a a b 
c b c 
b c a 
Let us construct a matrix     ⃗      for the profile  ⃗   
 a b c 
a - 2 2 
b 1 - 2 
c 1 1 - 
According to the minimax procedure the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗            
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Consider now a profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗ , which differs from the profile  ⃗   only by improved position of the 
alternative c in   
 : 
  
    
    
  
c a b 
a b c 
b c a 
Let us construct a matrix      
 ⃗⃗ ⃗     for the profile   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗  
 a b c 
a - 2 1 
b 1 - 2 
c 2 1 - 
According to the rule the alternatives a,b,c will be chosen, i.e.,     
 ⃗⃗ ⃗               
 (   
 ⃗⃗ ⃗   )  [
 ( ⃗    )   
      
 ( ⃗    )      
 
Thus, strict monotonicity condition is not satisfied. 
27.8 The non-compensatory condition 
Let           and the profile  ⃗   is the following 
P1 P2 P3 
a a b 
b b c 
c c a 
Let us construct a matrix     ⃗      for the profile  ⃗   
 a b c 
a - 2 2 
b 1 - 3 
c 1 0 - 
According to the rule the alternative a will be chosen, i.e.,    ⃗            
Let us write the profile  ⃗   in the following form 
          
a 3 3 1 
b 2 2 3 
c 1 1 2 
According to the non-compensatory condition the alternative b is better than the alternative a and 
the alternative a is better than the alternative c. Thus, the non-compensatory condition is not 
satisfied as        ⃗     . 
28. The Simpson procedure 
The Simpson procedure satisfies the same conditions as the minimax procedure. To prove it 
examples from paragraphs 27.1-27.8 of this section can be used. 
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